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The Women’s Convention, Reproductive Rights, and the 
Reproduction of Gender 
BARBARA STARK* 
Traditionalists, whether working within a religious or a “scientific” framework, have 
regarded women’s subordination as universal, God-given, or natural, hence 
immutable . . . . The traditionalist explanation focuses on women’s reproductive capacity 
and sees in motherhood woman’s chief goal in life . . . . Thus the sexual division of labor 
based on biological differences is seen as functional and just.1 
—Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 16-17 
INTRODUCTION 
President Barack Obama has asked Senator John Kerry, Chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, to move forward on the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women2 (“CEDAW” or the 
“Women’s Convention”),3 which President Jimmy Carter signed in 1978.4  This 
Article focuses on the consequences of ratification for reproductive rights.  
Under CEDAW, I argue, the United States would be required to fully assure 
these rights, including subsidized family planning services and abortion. 
Part I of this Article describes CEDAW’s broad prohibition against what I 
call ‘the reproduction of gender,’ including the “sexual division of labor based 
on biological differences” that historian Gerda Lerner5 and other feminist 
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 1. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 16-17 (1986). 
 2. G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 3. Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to John F. 
Kerry, Senator, U.S. Senate (May 11, 2009), available at http://globalsolutions.org/files/ 
general/White_House_Priorities_List.pdf. 
 4. As a signatory, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 
the United States must refrain from any action that would “defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty.”  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter VCLT]. 
 5. See LERNER, supra note 1, at 17. 
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scholars identify as the bedrock for women’s subordination.6  Part II explains 
why the denial of reproductive rights necessarily reproduces gender hierarchy, 
whether by the state or by non-state actors.  Part III explains how this plays out, 
internationally and in the United States.  It does so by drawing on recent work 
regarding the fragmentation of international law.  This fragmentation has led to 
the proliferation of national applications.  It then situates this law in U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence, showing how the argument set out in this Article 
resonates with the arguments of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Professors 
Sylvia Law, Reva Siegel and others, to ground reproductive rights in equality, 
rather than privacy.  Efforts to do so under the U.S. Constitution have failed.  As 
this Article demonstrates, CEDAW provides equality on steroids, equality that 
can do the work necessary to assure reproductive rights. 
It should be noted that many American proponents of CEDAW oppose my 
argument.  Rather, it is their view that CEDAW does not require support for 
family planning services and is “abortion neutral.”7  Indeed, pro-life opponents of 
ratification argue, as I do, that CEDAW requires support for family planning 
services and abortion.8  I agree, although in my view this is another reason why 
the United States should ratify CEDAW. 
 
 6. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Globalizing Feminist Ethics, HYPATIA, Spring 1998, at 7-31 (1998) 
(noting consensus among feminists in the developing world that “the abolition of the sexual division 
of labor [and] freedom of choice over childbearing” are necessary to overcome women’s 
subordination) (citation omitted); MAJA KIRILOVA ERIKSSON, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 166 (2000) 
(arguing that, “Reproductive freedom is sine qua non for the attainment of any real equality between 
women and men”); Arvonne S. Fraser, Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women’s 
Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 853, 867 (1999) (“Birth control is at the very heart of male/female 
relationships, and of any society’s future, and few other facets of life have the same emotional depth, 
as John Stuart Mill and others understood so well.  Safe and effective birth control and related 
information, including information on abortion, threatens a system as old as human life.”); see also 
Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex, in FEMINIST 
ANTHROPOLOGY 87, 90 (Ellen Lewin ed., 2006) (drawing on Claude Lévi-Strauss, Sigmund Freud, 
and Jacques Lacan to develop a theory of “a sex/gender system,” found in every society, consisting 
of “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is 
shaped by human, social intervention”); Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, A Cross-Cultural Perspective on 
Reproductive Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 366 (1995) (seeking commonalities between Western and Islamic 
approaches to gender rights).  But see Fraser, supra, at 899 (noting different views regarding the 
“roots of [gender] inequality” of the LDCs, western industrialized states, and the Soviet bloc at the 
Copenhagen Conference); Rosalind P. Petchesky, Negotiating Reproductive Rights, in SEXUALITIES AND 
SOCIETY 227, 230 (Jeffrey Weeks et al. eds., 1998) (“Despite its widespread use since the Cairo 
conference, the concept of reproductive rights is by no means universally accepted among feminist 
groups around the globe.  For some, it evokes a highly westernized and narrow frame of reference 
that reduces reproduction at best to fertility control and at worst to the single issue of abortion; or it 
evokes an even more devious scenario that masks racist and eugenic population control behind ‘a 
feminist face.’”) (citation omitted). 
 7. LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF 
ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 
13 (2009) (“[T]he Clinton Administration . . . declared the treaty abortion neutral in 1994. Supporters 
[of CEDAW] also emphasize that many countries where abortion is regulated or illegal, including 
Burkina Faso, Colombia, and Ireland, ratified the Convention without associated reservations, 
understandings, or declarations (RUDs), and regularly report to the CEDAW Committee.”). 
 8. Id. at 14 (noting that, “opponents of U.S. ratification argue that . . . [CEDAW] could lead to 
the abolishment of state parental notification laws, require federal funding for abortions, or obligate 
the U.S. government to promote and provide access to abortion.”).  I view these arguments as a 
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Both positions reflect their proponents’ strategies regarding ratification of 
CEDAW.9  They may be right, but I am not arguing that the United States 
should or should not ratify CEDAW, or that relying on CEDAW is or is not a 
useful strategy for furthering reproductive rights in the United States.  It may 
well have the opposite effect.10  Rather, my argument is that the Women’s 
Convention bars the reproduction of gender, which, as a matter of law, requires 
the assurance of women’s reproductive rights in the United States and 
everywhere else. 
I.  THE REPRODUCTION OF GENDER11 
A.  Reproductive Rights Under International Law 
Women’s rights are relatively new in international law.  While the 
International Bill of Rights12 requires states to treat women and men ‘equally,’ 
 
welcome concession, which should facilitate the actual provision of such support following 
ratification.  As pro-life advocates further observe, “In 1998, for example, the Committee 
recommended to Mexico that ‘all states . . . should review their legislation so that, where necessary, 
women are granted access to rapid and easy abortion.’  More recently, in 2007, the Committee urged 
Poland ‘to ensure that women seeking legal abortion have access to it, and that their access is not 
limited by the use of the conscientious objection clause.’”  Id. at 15. 
 9. Jeffrey Toobin, Not Covered, NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 2009, at 37 (pointing out that pro-choice 
Democrats, including President Obama, have “worked so hard to be respectful of [their] opponents . 
. . [that they] sometimes seem[ ] to cede them the moral high ground . . . [Obama] announce[d] 
‘Abortion vexes.’  The opponents of abortion aren’t vexed─ they are mobilized, focused, and driven 
to succeed.  The Catholic bishops took the lead in pushing for the Stupak amendment, and they 
squeezed legislators in a way that would do any K Street lobbyist proud.”); see Ann Shalleck, 
Offspring and Bodies: Dependency and Vulnerability in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of Rights, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1621 (2009) (urging a “move . . . beyond the rigid and distorting legal 
framework of competing maternal and fetal rights that dominates the jurisprudence of and 
argument surrounding abortion”). 
 10. See BLANCHFIELD, supra note 7, at 15.  The politics of abortion are complicated. Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg viewed Roe v. Wade as a political mistake, for example, which “prolonged 
divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue.”  Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of 
Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 11 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).  Justice 
William Brennan also thought it would have been wiser to wait and see what the legislatures might 
do, rather than set out Roe’s trimester framework.  Id. at 10.  More recently, Neal Devins has argued 
that public opinion drives the law in this context, so public opinion should be addressed before legal 
reform is attempted.  See generally Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) 
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318 (2009).  Reva Siegel has carefully documented the ways 
in which “constitutional culture channels social movement conflict.”  Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (explaining how “equal protection doctrine prohibiting sex discrimination was 
forged in the Equal Rights Amendment’s defeat”).  See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: 
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 
(2008) (documenting how the Right has tailored its arguments to reflect cultural change). 
 11. This includes the sexual division of labor based on biological differences.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 5-6.  As explained below, it may extend beyond the sexual division of labor to 
stereotypes arguably unrelated to it, but which nevertheless signal gender in a particular culture.  
For example, in the United States, dressing babies in pink signals that they are girls. 
 12. This consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil Covenant or ICCP]; and the 
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this assumes and confirms a male norm.13  The Covenants and the Universal 
Declaration protect rights in the public sphere, that is, the rights of individuals 
in their relations with the state.  Some family rights are recognized,14 but even 
here the focus is to protect the family from the state, rather than to protect 
women within the family from men.15  As the Committee responsible for 
monitoring CEDAW notes, “historically, human activity in public and private 
life has been viewed differently and regulated accordingly.  In all societies, 
women who have traditionally performed their roles in the private or domestic 
sphere have long had those activities treated as inferior.”16 
A similar dynamic has been noted in U.S. law, where constitutionally-
protected civil and political rights have been championed by men for more than 
200 years.  These rights are worth most to those women whose lives are most 
like men’s.  When women seek “formal” equality, when they demand the same 
rights as men to freedom of speech, for example, they can rely on well-
developed equality jurisprudence.  When women assert reproductive rights, 
they are in less well-charted territory.  These rights address issues historically 
and almost universally relegated to the private sphere, left to the determination 
of the married couple.  Reproductive rights in the United States were first 
articulated in the 1960s in Griswold v. Connecticut,17 which protected the couple’s 
freedom from state intrusion in the marital bedroom.  As a practical matter, this 
reflected and perpetuated women’s subordination within the marriage, since the 
husband was the decision maker in the traditional couple.18  Reproductive rights 
were not extended to individuals until Eisenstadt v. Baird19 in 1972. 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Economic Covenant]. 
 13. This is one reason equality jurisprudence lacks the muscle to assure reproductive rights in 
the United States.  See infra Part III.B; HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE 
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 12, art. 10. 
 15. Paula Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J.  881 (2000). 
 16. CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 21, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 38, 
¶¶ 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 1994), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom21 [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 
21]. 
 17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking Connecticut law barring the provision of contraceptives and 
medical advice regarding their use); see, e.g., JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH 
CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 3 (2005).  As explained infra Part III.B., in the 
United States, privacy doctrine has been widely criticized. 
 18. LERNER, supra note 1.  Many of the world’s women, including women in the United States, 
still spend much of their lives in the private sphere of the home and the family.  See General 
Recommendation No. 21, supra note 16, ¶ 8.  As the Committee further observes: 
As such activities are invaluable for the survival of society, there can be no justification for 
applying different and discriminatory laws or customs to them.  Reports of States parties 
disclose that there are still countries where de jure equality does not exist . . . Even where 
de jure equality exists, all societies assign different roles, which are regarded as inferior, to 
women.  In this way, principles of justice and equality contained in particular in article 16 
and also in articles 2, 5 and 24 of the Convention are being violated. 
General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 16, ¶ 12. 
 19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking Massachusetts law allowing doctors and pharmacists to provide 
contraceptives only to married persons); see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and 
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Reproductive rights are of similarly recent vintage in international law.  
The basic concept first appeared in 1968, in the final document approved by the 
Teheran Conference on Human Rights in 1968:20 “[T]he rights to decide freely 
and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have the 
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights.”21  But it was not until the World Conference on Population in 1994 
(“Cairo Conference”) that reproductive rights were clearly articulated.22  
Although convened to address population issues, the participants in the Cairo 
Conference recognized that: (1) family-planning programs should not involve 
any form of coercion, (2) government-sponsored economic incentives and 
disincentives were only marginally effective, and (3) governmental goals 
“should be defined in terms of unmet needs for information and services,” 
rather than quotas or targets imposed on service providers.23  The aim “should 
be to assist couples and individuals to achieve their reproductive goals and give 
them the full opportunity to exercise the right to have children by choice.”24  The 
Cairo Conference required states to meet the family planning needs of their 
populations as soon as possible, but no later than 2015.25  The Cairo Conference 
recognized that reproductive rights include both “the basic right of all couples 
and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and 
timing of their children, and to have the information and means to do so” and 
 
Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 634-42 (1986) (explaining how 
the struggle for reproductive rights shaped, and was shaped by, the women’s movement).  See 
generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 1519 (1994). 
 20. For a cogent overview, see generally Berta E. Hernández, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive 
Freedom as an International Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 309 (1991). 
 21. Proclamation of Teheran, May 13, 1968, art. 16, available at http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/b_tehern.htm; see Reed Boland, Symposium on Population Law: The 
Environment, Population, and Women's Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1158–60 (1997).  Reproductive 
rights encompass a wide range of activities.  These include surrogacy, other forms of assisted 
conception, female genital surgeries, and the health needs of women with HIV/AIDS. For a 
comprehensive overview, see REBECCA COOK ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2003).  See generally IVAR BLEIKLIE ET AL., COMPARATIVE BIOMEDICAL POLICY: GOVERNING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES  (2004).  The focus of this Article, like that of CEDAW, is on core 
reproductive rights, including those set out in the African Protocol.  See Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, 
CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005), available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/africa/protocol-women2003.html [hereinafter African Protocol].  Whether CEDAW 
includes a right to assisted conception, or whether surrogacy perpetuates gender stereotypes, for 
example, is beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of 
Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2008, at A9.  See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy 
and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009). 
 22. International Conference on Population and Development, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Report of the 
International Conference on Population and Development, ¶¶ 6.1, 7.12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 171/13 (Oct. 
18 1994) [hereinafter Cairo Conference]; see NADINE TAUB, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ISSUE PAPERS ON WORLD CONFERENCES (1994); see also Barbara B. 
Crane & Stephen L. Isaacs, The Cairo Programme of Action: A New Framework for International 
Cooperation on Population and Development Issues, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 295 (1995). 
 23. Cairo Conference, supra note 22, ¶ 7.12. 
 24. Id. ¶ 7.16.  A number of countries entered reservations, specifically objecting to the word 
“individuals” in ¶ 7.16. 
 25. Id. 
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“the right to obtain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.”26  
This somewhat awkward formulation reflects the participating states’ disparate 
approaches to reproductive rights as well as the failure of many states to 
address these rights at all.27 
The idea that women should have control over the number and spacing of 
their children remains controversial, especially in cultures where large families 
are viewed as desirable.28  Nevertheless, reproductive rights are increasingly 
recognized in international human rights law.29  These rights, including 
education about family planning and access to contraception, are now widely 
recognized throughout the world, often in connection with the right to health, a 
right which is not recognized in U.S. law.30  Almost every state allows access to 
contraception, and several states provide contraceptives as a free public health 
benefit.31 
Most states have not, however, fully assured women’s reproductive 
rights.32  This would require them to “respect” these rights, that is, to refrain 
from violating them; to “protect” them, that is, to assure that no third party 
 
 26. Id. ¶ 7.3.  These goals were reiterated at the United Nations, Fourth World Conference on 
Women.  As set out in the Beijing Platform:  “The human rights of women include their right to have 
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual 
and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.”  U.N. FOURTH WORLD 
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, THE BEIJING DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION, ¶ 96 (1995). 
 27. D. MARIANNE BROWER BLAIR ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 819-20 (2009) 
(describing the absence of reproductive rights in Lebanon). 
 28. RUTH DIXON-MUELLER, POPULATION POLICIES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING 
REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 107 (1993) (describing customs in the Sahel).   “Women in the Sahel have a 
minimal choice as to whether or when to bear a child [because] . . . . large families are highly 
esteemed and the social and religious pressures to bear many children are great.”  Abd-el Kader 
Boye et al., Marriage Law and Practice in the Sahel, 22 STUD. FAM. PLANNING 343, 347-48 (1991). 
 29. See, e.g., K.L. v. Peru, Comm. No. 1153/2003 P 2.1, Oct. 24, 2005, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003, ¶ 2.3 (2005).  As Goldberg sums up: 
In 2005, the U.N. Human Rights Committee decided its first abortion case, which dealt 
with a seventeen-year-old Peruvian girl who’d been forced to carry an anencephalic 
fetus−one missing most of its forebrain−to term, despite the fact that it had no chance of 
surviving more than a few days outside the womb. The committee ruled that Peru had ‘an 
obligation to take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.’ 
MICHELLE GOLDBERG, THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION 17 (2009). 
 30. See Economic Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 12.  This includes public health campaigns, 
whether conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO) or national agencies.  See, e.g., Simone 
Grilo Diniz et al., Not Like Our Mothers: Reproductive Choice and the Emergence of Citizenship Among 
Brazilian Rural Workers, Domestic Workers and Housewives, in NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 69, 
69 (Rosalind P. Petchesky & Karen Judd eds., 1998) (citing WHO study of fertility in Brazil); Sev S. 
Fluss, The World Health Organization and Women, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 411 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 2000) (describing work of the WHO).  The United 
States, unlike the other industrialized democracies, has not yet ratified the Economic Covenant. 
 31. See BLAIR ET AL., supra note 27, at 794. 
 32. As Michelle Goldberg notes: 
[I]n many poor countries, including large parts of Africa and Latin America and parts of 
Asia and the Middle East, abortion is either banned entirely or allowed only to save a 
woman’s life.  Twenty-six percent of the world’s women and men live under such laws, 
which are largely the relics of colonial constitutions promulgated by European countries 
that have since abandoned such restrictions for themselves. 
 GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 41. 
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restricts them; and to “fulfill” them, that is, to proactively assure their 
realization.33  Traditional human rights discourse, as set out in the International 
Bill of Rights,34 and even the provisions of the Women’s Convention which 
directly address reproductive rights,35 allow states to fall short.  Rather, it is 
CEDAW’s prohibition against the reproduction of gender which compels these 
rights, as explained below. 
B.  The Women’s Convention 
1.  Beyond Non-Discrimination 
CEDAW explicitly guarantees women’s human rights, including their 
rights to participate in social, economic, cultural and political life on equal terms 
with men.  These rights include the civil and political rights familiar to 
Americans from our own Constitution, such as the right to vote36 and freedom 
of movement.37  These rights also include less familiar economic and social 
rights, such as the right to work38 and the right to health.39 
Thus, CEDAW assures positive as well as negative rights, imposing 
obligations on the state.  Under CEDAW, moreover, rights are to be assured in 
fact as well as in law.  That is, CEDAW goes beyond formal equality (equality of 
opportunity) to require outcome equality.40  There is no required showing of 
discriminatory intent.  Under CEDAW, “discrimination” is genuinely robust: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “discrimination against 
women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of 
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis 
 
 33. The Committee explains the requirements to “respect, protect and fulfil” rights in the 
context of reproductive rights specifically: 
14. The obligation to respect rights requires States parties to refrain from obstructing action 
taken by women in pursuit of their health goals. . . . For example, States parties should not 
restrict women's access to health services or to the clinics that provide those services on 
the ground that women do not have the authorization of husbands, partners, parents or 
health authorities, because they are unmarried or because they are women. . . . 15.  The 
obligation to protect rights . . . requires States parties . . . to prevent and impose sanctions 
for violations of rights by private persons and organizations. . . . 17. The duty to fulfil rights 
places an obligation on States parties to take appropriate legislative, judicial, 
administrative, budgetary, economic and other measures to the maximum extent of their 
available resources to ensure that women realize their rights to health care. Studies such as 
those which emphasize the high maternal mortality and morbidity rates worldwide and 
the large numbers of couples who would like to limit their family size but lack access to or 
do not use any form of contraception provide an important indication for States parties of 
possible breaches of their duties to ensure women's access to health care. 
CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 24, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter General Recommendation No. 24]. 
 34. See supra note 12.  
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
 36. See BLANCHFIELD,  supra note 7, at art. 2. 
 37. Id. at art. 15.4. 
 38. Id. at art. 11. 
 39. Id. at art. 12. 
 40. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 13, at 217. 
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of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.41 
Under Article 2, furthermore, “States Parties condemn discrimination 
against women in all its forms” and “agree to pursue by all appropriate means 
and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women.”42  
Article 4 specifically provides for affirmative action “aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality.”43  CEDAW, in short, requires the state to assure actual equality 
between women and men, sooner rather than later.  As explained below, this is 
just the beginning. 
2.  The Sexual Division of Labor 
As anthropologist Gayle Rubin notes, the sexual division of labor based on 
biological differences appears in “endless variety and monotonous similarity, 
cross-culturally and throughout history.”44  As Rubin explains: 
Although every society has some sort of division of tasks by sex, the assignment 
of any particular task to one sex or the other varies enormously . . . [the purpose] 
is to insure the union of men and women by making the smallest viable 
economic unit contain at least one man and one woman.  The division of labor 
by sex can therefore be seen as a ‘taboo’: a taboo against the sameness of men 
and women, a taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive categories, a 
taboo which exacerbates the biological differences between the sexes and 
thereby creates gender.45 
The innumerable iterations of the sexual division of labor are often 
grounded in stereotypes of women as reproductive workers and men as 
productive workers.  This includes the ‘female-as-caregiver’ and ‘male-as-
rightsholder’ stereotypes described by Aristotle.46  In his polis, men were 
citizens, and therefore rightsholders.  A woman’s role was to reproduce male 
citizens, by raising them as well as literally producing them.  For Aristotle, this 
was ‘natural.’  Rightsholders were male—never pregnant, never breastfeeding—
and caregivers were female—always subject to the endless demands of 
caregiving, even if not actually pregnant or breastfeeding. 
CEDAW, in contrast, treats this bifurcation as socially constructed.  Under 
CEDAW, reproduction is both supported by the state and disaggregated from 
women’s traditional roles.  That is, even as CEDAW protects women’s 
reproductive rights, it situates reproduction in a social and cultural context.  
 
 41. BLANCHFIELD, supra note 7, at art. 1. 
 42. Id. at art. 2. 
 43. Id. at art. 4.  There is an enormous amount of literature on CEDAW.  See, e.g., Rebecca J. 
Cook, State Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 228 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Andrew Byrnes, Human Rights 
Instruments Relating Specifically to Women with Particular Emphasis on CEDAW, in ADVANCING THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 38-57 (Andrew Byrnes et al. eds., 1997); LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE 
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATINON OF ALL FORMS 
OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (1993); Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for 
Women?  Understanding CEDAW’s Equality Principles, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1133 (2009). 
 44. Rubin, supra note 6, at 90. 
 45. Id. at 94. 
 46. D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE HOUSEHOLD AS THE FOUNDATION OF ARISTOTLE’S POLIS 85 (2006). 
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Article 11.2, for example, sets out the measures to be taken by states to “prevent 
discrimination . . . on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure 
[women’s] effective right to work.”47  These measures include the prohibition of 
dismissal for pregnancy or maternity leave,48 maternity leave with pay or 
“comparable social benefits,”49 and the “necessary supporting social services to 
enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and 
participation in public life, in particular through the establishment . . . of 
childcare facilities.”50  Article 12 requires the state to “ensure access to healthcare 
services, including those related to family planning” and, more specifically, to 
“ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, 
confinement in the postnatal period, granting free services when necessary, as 
well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”51  Article 14 
reiterates the right to family planning services for rural women in particular.  
Finally, Article 16 requires states to “take all appropriate measure to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations.”52 
In addition to these specific guarantees, Article 5 more broadly demands 
recognition of maternity as a “social function.”53  It also requires states to 
educate men to share in reproductive work: 
States shall 
[T]ake all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority 
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of 
men and women in the upbringing and development of their children . . . .54 
 
 47. See CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 11.2. 
 48. Id. at art. 11.2(b). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at art. 11.2(c). 
 51. The Committee’s General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates on Article 12.1, addressing 
women’s access to health care, including family planning services.  The Committee recommends 
that, “[w]hen possible, legislation criminalizing abortion could be amended to remove punitive 
provisions imposed on women who undergo abortion.”  General Recommendation No. 24, supra 
note 33, ¶ 31(c).  For a more detailed formulation of these rights, see the African Protocol, supra note 
21.  See generally CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THE PROTOCOL ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA: AN 
INSTRUMENT FOR ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS (2006), available at http:// 
www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub_bp_africa.pdf. 
 52. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 16.  Article 16 has received an unprecedented number of 
reservations; Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643 (1990).  Two States Parties to the Convention—
Malta and Monaco—stated in their reservations to CEDAW that they do not interpret Article 16(1)(e) 
as imposing or forcing the legalization of abortion in their respective countries.  BLANCHFIELD,  supra 
note 7, at 14. 
 53. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5(b). 
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As noted in a leading human rights text, “the breadth and aspiration of this 
article can only be described as striking.”55  CEDAW recognizes that the sexual 
division of labor is socially constructed, and that it is neither immutable nor 
‘natural.’  At the same time, it remains widely internalized and over 
determined.56  Article 5 requires states to identify their own cultural “division of 
tasks by sex”57 and to eradicate them.58  The “stereotyped roles” that Article 5 
 
 54. Id. at art. 5 (emphasis added); see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive 
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 817 (2007) 
(“Perhaps the most prominent feature of the sexual equality approach to reproductive rights is its 
attention to the social as well as physical aspects of reproductive relations.  A sex equality analysis is 
characteristically skeptical of the traditions, conventions, and customs that shape the sex and family 
roles of men and women.”). 
 55. HENRY STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 184 (2008).  The effects, 
if any, of this prohibition on beauty pageants, drag queens, what Robin West has called “women’s 
hedonic lives,” or pornography is beyond the scope of this Article.  See Robin L. West, The Difference 
in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 
149, 155, 158, 213 (2000).  For a provocative account of the sexualization of popular culture in Eastern 
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, see CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEXUAL POLITICS 
AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 23-25 (1993). 
 56. Again, there is a vast literature on the internalization and over-determination of gender.  
See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL (2005); NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION 
OF MOTHERING (1989); DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976); Katharine 
T. Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1564 
(1974) (noting that “sex roles today are more deeply entrenched than race roles; it is still acceptable, 
after all, to teach sex roles at home and in school, long after instruction in racial bias has gone 
underground”).  For a compelling study of the ways in which the sexual division of labor is 
overdetermined in law school, see LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW 
SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997). 
 57. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5.  It is noteworthy that the U.S. delegate repeatedly stressed 
that the father’s responsibility for childcare be explicit in Article 5.  REHOF, supra note 43, at 86-87. 
 58. In Slovakia, for example, the Committee concluded: 
While welcoming measures taken by the State party to eliminate gender segregation in the 
labour market, including through training programmes in the area of equal opportunities, 
the Committee is concerned about the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the 
roles and tasks of women and men in the family and in society at large . . . [and] 
recommends that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the 
eradication of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labour market, the health 
sector, academia, politics and society at large. 
CEDAW Committee, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Slovakia, ¶¶ 32-33, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/4 (2008) [hereinafter Slovakia]. 
Nigeria reported on six ambitions programs, undertaken to eliminate stereotypes pursuant to Article 
5, including a new “National Policy on Education” which is “aimed at encouraging increased 
participation of the girl child in science and technology” and data indicating that women are 
“beginning to undertake those vocations which were previously considered masculine such as 
motor mechanic, welding, commercial drivers and motor-cyclists,” as well as efforts to publicize the 
Child’s Rights Act.  CEDAW Committee, Nigeria State Party Report, art. 5.1, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/NGA/6 (Oct. 5, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ 
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/687/84/PDF/N0668784.pdf.  In its Concluding Observations, the 
Committee, 
welcom[ed] the adoption by 18 states of the Child Rights Act, which sets the minimum age 
of marriage at 18 years, [noted] with concern section 29, paragraph 4, of the Constitution, 
which states that “a woman is deemed to be of full age upon marriage” and urged the 
repeal of the offending section without delay. 
Stark_paginated 9/7/2011  5:57:33 PM 
 THE REPRODUCTION OF GENDER 271 
prohibits are specific to particular cultures’ “division of tasks by sex,” whether it 
is being a cashier in Saudi Arabia59 or nursing in the United States.60  This 
necessarily includes the assurance of women’s reproductive rights, because the 
denial of these rights creates the sexual division of labor, as explained below.61  
Article 5 bars all of these stereotypes, even as it recognizes women’s unique 
reproductive capacity and men’s responsibility for reproductive work.  Rather, 
under CEDAW, women, like men, have rights, and men, like women, are 
expected to assume caregiving responsibilities. 
Because reproductive rights focus on experiences—conception, pregnancy, 
childbirth—that affect women more directly than they affect men, these 
experiences are not reflected in traditional rights discourse.62  CEDAW corrects 
this omission by recognizing women’s reproductive work and requiring the 
state—and men—to support it.  Whether by a state or a non-state third party, 
whether by an affirmative act (such as coerced sterilization), or by an omission 
 
CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women: Nigeria, ¶ 318, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6 (July 8, 2008), available at http:// 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-NGA-CO-6.pdf. 
In addition, “[t]he Committee note[d] the continued high incidence of female genital mutilation in 
some areas of the country . . . [and] the absence of national legislation prohibiting this harmful 
traditional practice.”  Id. ¶ 318-19.  It also went beyond the subjects addressed by Nigeria to focus on 
“the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes concerning women’s roles and 
responsibilities that discriminate against women and perpetuate their subordination within the 
family and society . . . [and] the persistence of entrenched harmful traditional and cultural norms 
and practices, including widowhood rites and practices.”  Id. ¶¶ 322, 324. 
 59. See, e.g., Fatima Sidiya, Debate Rages over Saudi Women Working as Cashiers, ARAB NEWS, Aug. 
18, 2010, http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/article106238.ece (describing online controversy 
regarding the announcement by the Panda supermarket chain that it planned to hire women as 
cashiers). 
 60. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GENDER ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL LABOR (2007);  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Some Occupations Becoming More Gender-Neutral, 48 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 48, 48 
(2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2004/winter/oochart.pdf (noting that men in the 
United States increased their share of employment in nursing between 1983 and 2002, although the 
field remains dominated by women).  But see Margarita Estévez-Abe, Gendering the Varieties of 
Capitalism: A Study of Occupational Segregation by Sex in Advanced Industrial Societies, 59 WORLD POL. 
142, 143 (2006) (noting “genuine puzzles” in cross-national patterns).  This does not mean, of course 
that women cannot nurse or that men cannot work as cashiers.  It means that the state has an 
obligation to identify and rectify gendered stereotypes: 
[W]hatever the motivation for different treatment, the result is to create a dual system of 
rights and responsibilities in which the rights of each group are governed by a different set 
of values. History and experience have taught us that in such a dual system one group is 
always dominant and the other subordinate.  As long as woman’s place is defined as 
separate, a male-dominated society will define her place as inferior. 
Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for 
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 873-74 (1971): 
 61. See infra Part II.  Men, too, have reproductive rights, and these, too, may be denied.  See, e.g., 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649, 648 (1972) (holding unmarried father had custodial rights to his 
children after their mother died).  The ways in which the denial—and the assurance—of men’s 
reproductive rights reproduce gender are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 62. As Brenda Cossman argues, “citizenship has always been sexed.”  Brenda Cossman, Sexual 
Citizens: Freedom, Vibrators, and Belonging, in GENDER EQUALITY (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. 
Grossman eds. 2009). 
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(such as the refusal to fund elective abortions),63 whether imposed on all women 
or a discrete group, whether the objective is to disempower women or to 
promote women’s equality, the denial of women’s reproductive rights is barred 
by CEDAW.64 
C.  International Equality Jurisprudence 
The argument that CEDAW requires the full assurance of women’s 
reproductive rights is further supported by two recent developments in 
international equality jurisprudence.  The first is grounded in rigorous studies 
documenting women’s economic subordination.  The second focuses on the 
burgeoning case law and commentary on same-sex relationships.  Both confirm 
that the sexual division of labor is socially, economically, and legally 
constructed, and that it can be deconstructed.  However entrenched, the sexual 
division of labor can—and should—be dismantled by law.65 
1. Women’s Poverty 
As the CEDAW Committee explains, “public and private spheres of human 
activity have always been considered distinct, and have been regulated 
accordingly.  Invariably, women have been assigned to the private or domestic 
 
 63. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Robert Pear, A Victory in Health Care Vote for Opponents of 
Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at A1 (describing restriction on abortion coverage added to the 
health care bill passed by the House of Representatives). 
 64. CEDAW does not explicitly assure the right to abortion, reflecting the lack of consensus 
among states.  See, e.g., Cons. Const. 1975 J.C.P. II, No. 18030 (Fr.) (upholding France’s abortion law 
as consistent with Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen); Orzeczenie 
Trybunalu Konstytucyjnega z Dnia 28 May 1997 r. (Sygn.akt K. 26/96) (Pol.) (decision of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal striking down legislation enacted to liberalize abortion citing, inter alia, 
Poland’s Constitution, which protects human life even at the pre-natal stage and the preamble to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child).  See generally Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German 
Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1978); Florian 
Miedel, Is West Germany’s 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion Debate?  A Critique 
of Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 471, 475 (1993-94); Law 
No. 239 of 24 March 1970 on the interruption of pregnancy, as amended by Law No. 564 of 19 July 
1978 and Law No. 572 of 12 July 1985 (Fin.), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/ 
abortion/Finland.abo.htm.  Finland’s more restrictive laws reflect its “more conservative culture,” 
despite its “common legal heritage and close ties with Sweden.”  David Bradley, Convergence in 
Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 127 (1999).  
The CEDAW Committee has criticized states for prohibiting abortion, however.  See supra note 8.  
But see BLANCHFIELD,  supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting that CEDAW has been ratified without RUDs by 
many states limiting abortion).  “Currently, 61% of the world’s people live in countries where 
induced abortion is permitted either for a wide range of reasons or without restriction as to reason.  
In contrast, 26% of all people reside in countries where abortion is generally prohibited.”  Ctr. for 
Reprod. Rights, World Abortion Law Fact Sheet (2009), available at http://reproductiverights.org/ 
sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_fac_abortionlaws2009_WEB.pdf (listing countries).  
The Committee has also pointed out that “it is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide 
legally for the performance of certain reproductive health services for women.”  General 
Recommendation No. 24, supra note 33, ¶ 11. 
 65. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra 
note 10, at 66 (noting that “[s]ystems of dominion are neither total nor stable, especially in a society 
as skeptical of aristocracy and status as is ours”); DIXON-MUELLER, supra note 28, at 108 (describing 
success of family planning programs in Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines, despite unfavorable 
“[c]ultural and religious (as well as socio-economic) conditions”). 
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sphere, associated with reproduction and the raising of children, and in all 
societies these activities have been treated as inferior.”66  As Marilyn Waring and 
others show, women’s work is economically invisible—it does not appear in 
national statistics.67  Women everywhere do all or most of the childcare, they 
clean and maintain the family home, they prepare the family’s food and nurse 
family members when they become sick.  Even when women work outside the 
home, they continue to perform far more of this work than men.  In the United 
States, for example, Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung described “the second 
shift” worked by employed women in the home amounting to an extra month’s 
work each year compared to their husbands.68  As sociologist Suzanne Bianchi 
and her colleagues have recently shown, the “second shift” persist twenty years 
later, albeit in more complicated forms: “Fathers’ increased childcare seems to 
have accelerated particularly in the 1990s . . . [but] [m]others still shoulder twice 
as much childcare and house work.”69 
When women work outside of the home, moreover, most work in lower-
paid ‘female’ occupations, replicating the sexual division of labor within the 
family.70  Because of the sexual division of labor, women remain relegated to a 
private sphere of home and family, poverty and powerlessness.71  They perform 
66% of the world’s work,72  but they earn only 10% of the world’s income,73 and 
own merely 1% of the world’s property.74  The sexual division of labor is not the 
only cause of women’s poverty, but it is indisputably a major factor.75  Thus, the 
 
 66. CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 23, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
A/52/38 (Jan. 31, 1997).  The Committee concludes: “By contrast, public life, which is respected and 
honoured, extends to a broad range of activity outside the private and domestic sphere. Men 
historically have both dominated public life and exercised the power to confine and subordinate 
women within the private sphere.”  Id. 
 67. MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED 74, 91 (1988); see also MARILYN WARING, THREE 
MASQUERADES: ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, WORK AND HUMAN RIGHTS 58 (1996).  For a detailed 
description of women’s global economic subordination, see CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 
13, at 4-14. 
 68. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND 
THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 4, 14 (1989). 
 69. SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 177 (2006); see 
also Sarah M. Kendig & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Single, Cohabitating, and Married Mothers’ Time with 
Children, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1228 (2008); Melissa A. Milkie et al., The Time Squeeze: Parental 
Statuses and Feelings About Time With Children, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 739 (2004). 
 70. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 13, at 6.  Even when women immigrate to find work, 
many continue to support their families, sending remittances back home.  Facts & Figures on Women, 
Poverty, and Economics, U.N. DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN [UNIFEM], available at http:// 
www.unifem.org/gender_issues/ women_poverty_economics/facts_figures.php (last visited Oct. 
15, 2009) (noting that in 2008 migrants worldwide sent US$305 billion home, three times the volume 
of aid, and that women constitute 50 percent or more of migrant workers in Asia and Latin 
America). 
 71. See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that “in no country do 
women have equal political power to men”). 
 72. UNIFEM, FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 70, at 1.  See generally WARING, supra note 67. 
 73. UNIFEM, FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 70, at 1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Other factors include educational disparities and archaic laws and customs regarding 
employment, property ownership, inheritance, and marriage.  See, e.g., MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS,  Goal 3, Target 1 www.un.org/millenniumgoals/gender.shtml  (noting that “[f]or girls in 
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elimination of the sexual division of labor is essential for women’s economic and 
social equality. 
In addition, by impoverishing women, the sexual division of labor 
impoverishes the families and communities in which they live.  Women are less 
likely to spend money on alcohol or other forms of entertainment for 
themselves, and more likely to spend it in ways that benefit their children and 
families.76  As the World Bank observes, “a host of studies suggest that putting 
earnings in women’s hands is the intelligent thing to do to speed up 
development and the process of overcoming poverty.”77  Because women tend 
to reinvest more in their families and communities than men, the entire 
community benefits when women’s poverty is reduced. 
2.  Same-Sex Relationships 
The second development in international equality jurisprudence which 
supports the argument against the sexual division of labor is its recent focus on 
same-sex couples.78  As Justice Albie Sachs explained in Fourie, extending the 
benefits of marriage to same-sex partners is fundamentally a matter of equality: 
[O]ur Constitution represents a radical rupture with a past based on intolerance 
and exclusion, and the movement forward to the acceptance of the need to 
develop a society based on equality and respect by all for all. A democratic, 
universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces everyone 
and accepts people for who they are. The acknowledgement and acceptance of 
difference is particularly important in our country where for centuries group 
membership based on supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour 
has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage . . . . [A]t issue is a 
need to affirm the very character of our society as one based on tolerance and 
mutual respect.79 
 
some regions, education remains elusive” and that “poverty is a major barrier to education for 
girls”); Sidiya, supra note 59 (archaic laws and customs regarding employment); CYNTHIA GRANT 
BOWMAN & AKUA KUENYEHIA, WOMEN AND LAW IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 143-66 (2003) (describing 
the ways in which plural legal systems in Africa operate to deprive women of access to land); id. at 
167-220 (explaining problems of female inheritance in Africa); Julie Mertus, State Discriminatory 
Family Law and Customary Abuses, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS 135, 137-39 (Julie Peters & 
Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (describing ongoing child marriage, polygamy, dowry and bridewealth 
practices).  The precise extent to which such disparities, laws, and customs may themselves be traced 
to the changeable, and various, sexual divisions of labor described above is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 76. World Bank, The World Bank and Gender Equality: At a Glance [hereinafter World Bank, Gender 
Equality], http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTGENDER/0,,content 
MDK:22386117~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:336868,00.html (last visited May 6, 2011). 
 77. Id. (noting further that this could be “one reason that countries with greater gender equality 
tend to have lower poverty rates”). 
 78. International equality jurisprudence has not focused on reproductive rights because in most 
states where these rights have emerged, they have done so as part of a broader right to health.  See 
supra notes 30-31. 
 79. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie [2005] (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (finding a right to same-sex 
marriage in the South African Constitution); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941 (Mass. 2003) (finding a right to same-sex marriage in the Massachusetts’ constitution’s right to 
equality).  For a thoughtful comparison of Goodridge and Fourie, see Lisa Newstrom, The Horizon of 
Rights: Lessons from South Africa for the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-Sex Marriage, 40 CORNELL INT’L 
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Like racial discrimination, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
is grounded in intolerance and exclusion.  In validating same-sex marriage, 
courts and legislatures throughout the world have rejected the notion of a 
‘natural’ sexual division of labor requiring marriage to be restricted to a union 
between a man and a woman.80  Rather, there is growing recognition that a state 
committed to democratic values, especially the equality of its citizens, can no 
longer endorse laws that discriminate against some of those citizens. 
The European Union, with its twenty-seven member states, has been a 
leader in recognizing the equal rights of same-sex couples.81  The European 
Court of Human Rights, for example, has interpreted the European Convention 
on Human Rights to require contracting nations to recognize family rights of 
same-sex couples.82  The Court relied on Article 14, which provides that the 
rights set forth in the Convention are to be secured “without discrimination on 
any ground” to allow the surviving member of a gay couple to remain in his 
flat.83  Under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, similarly, the European Council 
passed Council Directive 2000/78/EC, which prohibits “any direct or indirect 
discrimination based on . . . sexual orientation.”84  In 2008, the European Court 
of Justice relied on this Directive to hold that the surviving partner of a German 
same-sex partner might be able to claim a pension.85  The Treaty of Lisbon,86 
which entered into force on December 1, 2009, assures the right to marriage 
without any language limiting such right to “men and women” and expressly 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.87 
 
L.J. 781, 803 (2007).  For a discussion of developments in the United States, see Anita Bernstein, 
Subverting the Marriage-Amendment Crusade with Law and Policy Reform, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 79, 
120 (2007) (endorsing policy reform as an incremental but effective strategy and suggesting a range 
of sources for “policy-innovation ideas”).  For a survey, see Note, Developments in the Law—The Law 
of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2087-91 (2003). 
 80. See infra text accompanying note 110. 
 81. See generally Katharina Boele-Woelki, The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships Within 
the European Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1949 (2008). 
 82. See, e.g., Application No. 40016/98 Karner v. Austria 24.7.  In the case of Slovakia, the 
Committee stated: 
While welcoming measures taken by the State party to eliminate gender segregation in the 
labour market, including through training programmes in the area of equal opportunities, 
the Committee is concerned about the persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the 
roles and tasks of women and men in the family and in society at large… [and] 
recommends that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the 
eradication of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labor market, the health sector, 
academia, politics and society at large. 
Slovakia, supra note 58, at 95. 
 83. Id.  The Karner Court also cited Article 8, which guarantees each individual “the right to 
respect for his private and family life.”  Karner, p. 7. 
 84. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 
 85. Case C-267/06, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 2008 E.C.R. 1-1757. 
 86. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.  The Treaty of Lisbon is also called the 
“Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” 
 87. Id. at art. 21.1; see Elizabeth F. Defeis, Current Development in the European Union: The Treaty of 
Lisbon and Human Rights, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 419 (2010). 
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Same-sex couples in other regions have also drawn on human rights law to 
challenge discrimination.  In South America, for example, same sex-couples 
have sought assistance from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  
In The Case of Marta Lucia Alvarez Giraldo,88 the Commission reviewed a 
complaint brought by the applicant against Colombia, alleging that the director 
of the prison in which the applicant was incarcerated had refused her request 
for intimate visits from her female life partner on the basis of her sexual 
orientation.  Finding that Colombian law afforded prisoners a right to intimate 
visits, the Commission determined that the applicant had stated a colorable 
claim of arbitrary and abusive interference with her private life, in violation of 
Article 11(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights.89 
On June 3, 2008, the Organization of American States (OAS) General 
Assembly, with the support of thirty-four countries, adopted a Resolution on 
Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity.90  The resolution 
recognizes the significance of the adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles and 
stresses the core principles of universality and non-discrimination in 
international law.  In addition, states “agreed to hold a special meeting ‘to 
discuss the application of the principles and norms’ of the inter-American 
system to abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”91 
In North America, Canada passed the Civil Marriage Act in 2005 which 
recognizes same-sex marriage.92  The United States enacted the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.93  DOMA defines marriage as a union between a 
man and a woman, but it does not preclude states from recognizing same-sex 
marriage under their own laws.  Five states currently allow same-sex marriage.94  
Forty-three states have laws explicitly prohibiting such marriages, including 
twenty-nine with constitutional amendments restricting marriage to one man 
and one woman.95  In Perry v. Schwarzenegger,96 Judge Vaughn Walker relied on 
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down California’s Proposition 8, which 
 
 88. Giraldo v. Colombia, Case No. 11.656, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 71/99 (1999). 
 89. Id.  Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter by friendly settlement, the 
Commission declared the case admissible, and agreed to publish the decision, to continue analyzing 
the merits of the case, and to renew its efforts to conclude a friendly settlement. 
 90. Rex Wockner, Norway Legalizes Gay Marriage, S.F. BAY TIMES¸ June 19, 2008, http:// 
www.sfbaytimes.com/index.php?sec=article&article_id=8382. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch.33 (Can.).  See generally Peter Bowal & Carlee Campbell, The 
Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in Canada, 21 AM. J. FAM. L. 37 (2007). 
 93. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. 1738C 
(2006)). 
 94. They are: Massachusetts, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); 
Connecticut, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412-14 (Conn. 2008); Iowa, Varnum v. 
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 (2011); and New Hampshire, 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 457:1 (2011).  See generally Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage:  Refining the 
Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2195, 2214 (2005); J. Thomas Oldham, Developments in the 
US − The Struggle over the Creation of a Status for Same-Sex Partners, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF 
FAMILY LAW 481 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2006). 
 95. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 27, at 144; see also State by State: The Legal Battle over Gay Marriage, 
NPR, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=112448663. 
 96. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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barred same-sex marriage.  In doing so, Judge Walker raised the question of 
same-sex marriage in the United States to the constitutional level for the first 
time.97 
On the international level, too, the trend is clearly toward the recognition of 
rights for same-sex couples.  In Toonen v. Australia,98 for example, the Human 
Rights Committee determined that the provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal 
Code, which criminalized private same-gender sexual conduct between 
consenting adults, constituted an arbitrary interference with the author’s 
privacy, in violation of Article 17 of the ICCPR.99  The Committee also held, 
however, that the rights of same-sex couples to marry cannot be grounded in the 
Civil Covenant because of its specific language.100 
 In part because of such limitations in existing human rights law,101 in 2006 
the International Commission of Jurists and the International Service for Human 
Rights, on behalf of a coalition of human rights organizations, convened a 
meeting in Indonesia to develop a set of international principles regarding 
sexual orientation and gender identity.  Twenty-nine distinguished experts in 
human rights law from twenty-five countries unanimously adopted the 
Yogyakarta Principles,102 which they agreed “reflect the existing state of 
international human rights law in relation to issues of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.”103  As set out in the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
 
 97. See Editorial, Marriage is a Constitutional Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A26.  On 
February 23, 2011, the Obama Administration advised the Speaker of the House that it would no 
longer defend the constitutionality of Sec. 3 of DOMA.  Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, DOJ Should 
Stop Defending in Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011, 12:21 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/ obama-doma-unconstitutional_n_827134.html. 
 98. Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. 
No. 40, vol. II, at 226, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994). 
 99. The Committee further found that criminalization could not be justified by the intent to 
prevent the spread of AIDS.  Id. 
 100. Id.  As the Committee explained in another case: 
Article 23, paragraph 2 of the Covenant is the only substantive provision . . . which defines 
a right by using the term ‘men and women’, rather than ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’, 
and ‘all persons’.  Use of the term ‘men and women’, rather than the general terms used 
elsewhere in Part III of the Covenant, has been consistently and uniformly understood as 
indicating that the treaty obligation of the States parties stemming from article 23, 
paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to recognize as marriage only the union between a man 
and woman . . . . 
Joslin v. New Zealand, Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 902/1999, P 8.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (2002) (upholding New Zealand’s refusal to permit same-gender couples 
to marry); Quilter v. Att’y Gen. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.).  For a provocative discussion, see 
Vincent J. Samar, Throwing Down the International Gauntlet: Same-Sex Marriage as a Human Right, 6 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1 (2007). 
 101. Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 232 (2008) (noting that 
“[t]he High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, has expressed concern about the 
inconsistency of approach in law and practice . . . [regarding] . . . sexual orientation and gender 
identity”). 
 102. YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org (last visited May 10, 2011). 
 103. Id. 
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(“ICJ”),104 the views of such experts may be relied upon in determining rules of 
law.  The Yogyakarta Principles, rigorously supported by sixty-six pages of 
jurisprudential annotations,105 affirm a broad range of rights, including “the 
universal enjoyment of human rights, equality and non-discrimination . . . to 
which all human beings are entitled without distinction as to sexual orientation 
or gender identity.”106  The Principles also set out concrete measures states must 
take to assure these rights. 
On December 18, 2008, sixty-six nations at the UN General Assembly 
supported a groundbreaking Statement confirming that international human 
rights protections apply to sexual orientation and gender identity.  The 
Statement was read by Argentina and a Counterstatement, signed by fifty-nine 
states, was read by the Syrian Arab Republic.107  The states opposing human 
rights for same-sex couples do not seek to ground their arguments in 
international law.  Rather, they claim that the Statement endorsing these rights 
“lack[ed] . . . legal grounds [and] delves into matters which fall essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of States.”108  This is belied by the exhaustive 
research supporting the Yogyakarta Principles.109  While there is no state 
consensus on the issue, there is a clear trend toward recognizing the rights of 
same-sex couples.  Thus, although homosexuality remains a crime in seventy-six 
countries and is still punishable by death in five, a growing body of 
international equality jurisprudence increasingly supports these rights.110 
 
 104. I.C.J. Stat., art. 38.1(d) provides in pertinent part:  “The Court . . . shall apply . . . the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.” 
 105. MICHAEL O’FLAHERTY, JURISPRUDENTIAL ANNOTATIONS TO THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES   
(2007),  http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/yogyakarta-principles-jurisprudential-
annotations.pdf. 
 106. YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, supra note 102. 
 107. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 70th plen. mtg. at 30, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.70 (Dec. 18, 2008). The 
Counterstatement, signed by 59 states, condemned the Statement, arguing further that: 
More important, it depends on the ominous usage of two notions.  The notion of 
orientation spans a wide range of personal choices that expand far beyond the individual 
sexual interest in a copulatory behavior between normal consenting adult human beings, 
thereby ushering in the social normalization and possibly the legitimization of many 
deplorable acts, including paedophilia.  The second notion is often suggested to attribute 
particular sexual interests or behaviours to genetic factors, a matter that has repeatedly 
been scientifically rebuffed. 
Id. at 31. 
 108. Id. at 31; see also O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 101, at 238, 246-47 (describing the “[r]eaction 
by States and other [a]ctors within United Nations [f]ora”). 
 109. See supra note 105; see also O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 101. 
 110. DANIEL OTTOSSON, HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME-SEX 
ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 4 (2010), available at http://www.rfsl.se/public/ 
ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2010.pdf.  This jurisprudence includes the recent decision of 
the High Court of Delhi, which ruled in 2009 that section 377 of the Indian Penal Code could not be 
applied to sexual activities between consenting adults.  Id.  The ruling affects all of India, except 
Jammu and Kashmir, where a different penal code applies, and affects approximately one-sixth of 
the human population.  Id. 
The absence of consensus only matters in ascertaining customary international law, which is not in 
issue.  It could be argued, however, that there is regional customary international law with respect to 
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II. HOW THE DENIAL OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS REPRODUCES GENDER 
This Part explains how the denial of reproductive rights reproduces 
gender.111  Reproductive rights may be usefully conceptualized along a 
continuum.  At one end, women have no choice as to when they will be 
impregnated or by whom.112  This reproduces gender because women may, at 
any time, be assigned reproductive work which only women can do.113  This 
work does not end with childbirth.  Rather, as the CEDAW Committee notes, 
“the responsibilities that women have to bear and raise children affect their right 
of access to education, employment and other activities related to their personal 
development.  They also impose inequitable burdens of work on women.”114  
Women’s socially-constructed responsibilities for taking care of their children, as 
well as feeding, clothing, and nurturing the whole family, reproduce gender by 
perpetuating the stereotype of women as caregivers.115 
Also at this end of the continuum are women involuntarily sterilized,116 
forced to use contraceptives, or have abortions.117  First, these anti-natalist 
measures reproduce gender by denying women the choice to have children, 
perpetuating the stereotype of women as subordinates for whom such decisions 
can be made.118  Second, such measures reproduce gender by using women’s 
 
same-sex relationships in Europe.  See Anjuli Willis McReynolds, Comment, What International 
Experience Can Tell U.S. Courts About Same-Sex Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1073, 1110 (2006). 
 111. See supra note 11. 
 112. This is the fate of the “handmaids” in Margaret Atwood’s dystopia, The Handmaid’s Tale.  See 
generally MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985).  Utopias and dystopias play an 
important role in the development of feminist theory.  As Lerner notes, “utopian projections into the 
past serve an important function for those who wish to create theory ─ to know what might have 
been possible opens us up to new interpretations.”  LERNER, supra note 1, at 38.  See generally 
FRANCES BARTKOWSKI, FEMINIST UTOPIAS (1989).  As MacKinnon muses, “Given the pervasiveness of 
inequality, imagination is the faculty required to think in sex equality terms.  What would it be like if 
women had power, knowing what women know?”  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex 
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1327 (1991). 
 113. As Katharine T. Bartlett noted thirty-five years ago, “That women may and do become 
pregnant is the most significant single factor used to justify the countless laws and practices that 
have disadvantaged women for centuries.”  Bartlett, supra note 56, at 1532. 
 114. See General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 66. 
 115. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2 (describing female-as-caregiver stereotype).  See generally Frances E. 
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); 
Barbara Stark, Nurturing Rights:  An Essay on Women, Peace, and International Human Rights, 13 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 144 (1991). 
 116. See, e.g., María Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 71/03, Friendly 
Settlement Agreement (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/71-03.html; see 
also Martha F. Davis & Bethany Withers, Reproductive Rights in the Legal Academy: A New Role For 
Transnational Law, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 43 (2009) (noting that “[the Chávez case] stemmed from 
Peru’s government policy of sterilizing poor, rural women in the 1980s and 1990s.  Ms Chávez died 
from complications following a forced sterilization procedure.”). 
 117. As Sherry Colb points out, “[opposition to coerced abortions] is one of the few areas of 
absolute overlap between those who believe abortion is constitutionally protected and those who do 
not.”  Sherry F. Colb, To Whom Do We Refer When We Speak of Obligations to “Future Generations”?: 
Reproductive Rights and the Intergenerational Community, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (2009). 
 118. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty observes, this is a common experience for poor women of 
color throughout the developing world: 
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reproductive capacity against the racial or ethnic group of which they are a part, 
whether the aim is to limit the reproduction of the group or genocide.119  A 
woman has no control over her own capacity to reproduce; rather, that capacity 
is controlled by the state to reduce or eliminate the racial or ethnic group of 
which she is a member.  This is explicitly recognized in the Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 4(d), which defines 
“imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” as a form of 
genocide.120  Third, often overlapping but nevertheless distinct, anti-natalist 
measures may reproduce gender by using women’s reproductive capacity 
against the economic class of which they are a part.  This was a major concern 
during the Cold War.  As Goldberg explains, “fears of [a] swelling third world 
population” was the original impetus for U.S. family planning aid to poor 
 
[B]ecause of the race- and class-based history of population control and sterilization abuse, 
women of color have a clearly ambivalent relation to the “abortion rights” platform.  For 
poor women of color, the notion of a “woman’s right to choose” to bear children has 
always been mediated by a coercive, racist state. 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics 
of Feminism, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (Chandra Talpade Mohanty et 
al., eds. 1991), at 1, 12.  Goldberg provides a more graphic account: “Faced with fertility goals and 
targets set from above, family planning workers from India to Indonesia cajoled, bribed, and 
sometimes forced people into accepting birth control, and even sterilization.  All over the world 
birth control clinics were upgraded while other health facilities languished, dirty and run-down.”  
GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 67.  See generally LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A 
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 334 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the infamous Dalkon 
Shield as “probably [responsible for] hundreds of thousands of severe infections and injuries, often 
leading to sterility and other permanent damage and long-lasting pain,” and noting that “as the 
awareness of dangers grew in the United States, [A. H. Robbins] dumped thirty-five thousand 
shields on the international market.  The company later refused to notify third-world users of the 
IUD’s dangers, agreeing only to alert foreign embassies.”).  In the United States, as Professor Roberts 
notes: 
Slave masters’ control of Black women’s reproduction illustrates better than any other 
example I know the importance of reproductive liberty to women’s equality.  Every 
indignity that comes from the denial of reproductive autonomy can be found in slave 
women’s lives – the harms of treating women’s wombs as procreative vessels, of policies 
that pit a mother’s welfare against that of her unborn child, and of government attempts to 
manipulate women’s childbearing decisions through threats and bribes. 
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 
23 (1997).  This troubled history has been exploited by anti-abortion groups.  Anti-abortion groups 
have recently charged that, “Black children are an endangered species,” on 65 billboards in Georgia.  
Shaila Dewan, Anti-Abortion Billboards on Race Split Atlanta, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A9.  The 
groups note that black women in that state have a disproportionate number of abortions.  Id.  The 
claim about black children is dubious, however, since the fertility rate among black women remains 
higher than the national average.  See id. 
 119. As Roberts notes, “reproductive policy affects the status of entire groups.” ROBERTS, supra 
note 118, at 23; see also e.g., Gisela Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory 
Sterilization, and the State, in RENATE BRIDENTHAL, WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY 271, 277 (1984) 
(noting that “in 1936 . . . sterilization by X-rays was included in the [German] sterilization law.  
Later, officials favored this procedure as an easy method for mass sterilization of camp inmates 
without their knowledge.”).  See generally Jeremy Telman, Abortion and Women’s Legal Personhood in 
Germany: A Contribution to the Feminist Theory of the State, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 91 (1998). 
 120. Statute of the International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 211 
(1993). 
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countries.121  Reducing the number of poor people, in short was viewed as 
crucial to the fight against communism.  For some women, accordingly, the 
reproduction of gender has been exacerbated by the reproduction of race and 
class subordination. 
At the other end of the continuum are women who not only have the same 
legal rights as men, but rights assuring support for reproduction as well.  Just as 
the larger community benefits from reproduction, it shares in its costs.122  Under 
CEDAW, this is accomplished by assuring women’s right to health—and all 
other rights123—before, during, and after pregnancy.  In addition, as set out in 
Article 5, men as well as women are responsible for childcare,124 and gendered 
stereotypes are barred.125 
The denial of reproductive rights reproduces gender because it takes 
control of their own reproductive capacity away from women, relegating them 
to a sexual division of labor based on biological differences.  It puts their bodies 
at the service of men or the state.  The denial of reproductive rights reproduces 
gender whether by a state or a non-state party, whether by explicit 
prohibitions126 or by the failure to provide necessary services, including 
childcare. 
 
 121. GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 41. 
 122. This is what sex equality looks like in feminist utopias, where it is often accomplished by 
technology that takes over reproductive work.  See, e.g., CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, HERLAND 
(1915) (women reproduce asexually).  MacKinnon describes it succinctly: 
If sex equality existed, there would be no more forced sex; safe effective contraception 
would be available and the psychological pressures surrounding its use would be gone; 
whatever womanhood meant, women would need neither men nor intercourse nor babies 
to prove it; abortions for sex-selection as now practiced would be unthinkable; the 
workplace would be organized with women as much in mind as men; the care of children 
would be a priority for adults without respect to gender; women would be able to support 
themselves and their families (in whatever form) in dignity through the work they do. 
MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1326-27. 
 123. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 11.1(f) (“safeguarding of the function of reproduction” 
in connection with working conditions); id. at art. 11.2(b) (requiring states to “introduce maternity 
leave with pay or with comparable social benefits.”). 
 124. See e.g., David Leonhardt, A Labor Market Punishing to Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at 
B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/business/economy/ 04leonhardt.html (noting that “the 
main barrier [to gender equality] is the harsh price most workers pay for pursuing anything other 
than the old-fashioned career path. ‘Women do almost as well as men today,’ [Columbia University 
Professor Jane] Woldfogel said, ‘as long as they don’t have children.’”); CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 
5(b); id. at art. 11.2(c) (requiring states to “encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social 
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities . . . [by 
promoting] a network of child-care facilities.”). 
 125. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5(a) (“To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.”). 
 126. Sometimes bans on abortion and contraception blatantly violate reproductive rights, like the 
ban in Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu.  According to one source, there were “over 10,000 deaths 
from illegally performed abortions and approximately 5.2 million cases of permanent sterility 
resulting from faulty . . . procedures.”  Abrams, supra note 15, at 897.  In 1966, Council of State 
Decree No. 700 criminalized abortion and radically restricted access to contraceptives.  Reed Boland, 
The Environment, Population and Women's Human Rights, 27 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1141-42 (1997).  Birth rates 
soared, as did maternal mortality, mostly from illegal abortions.  According to unofficial estimates, 
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A.  Denial by the State 
States have a legitimate interest in regulating reproduction to promote the 
health and general welfare of their citizens.127  Unlike most of the world, the 
United States does not have a natalist policy.128  83% of the global population 
lives in a state that has demographic goals that are supported by government 
policies in order to achieve them.129  Such policies may range from producing 
“soldiers for Islam,” as the Ayatollah exhorted Iranian women in the 1980s,130 or 
workers for the state, as East Germany urged women in the 1950s.131  The state 
objective may be illegal, like the genocidal rapes in the former Yugoslavia.132  Or 
the state policy may simply institutionalize customs that enable men to control 
women’s sexuality.133 
 
Romanian women were likely to have five illegal abortions by the age of forty, resulting in an 
infertility rate of twenty percent.  U.N. Population Div., Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Abortion 
Policies: A Global Review, Romania (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ 
population/publications/abortion/doc/romania.doc.  The law was rescinded by the new 
government in 1989, id., but there were grim consequences, including a sizable cohort of unwanted, 
neglected, and abandoned children.  Stuart Rennie, The Ethics of Research on Neglected Children in 
Romania, GLOBAL BIOETHICS BLOG (Jan. 11, 2008, 11:18 PM), http://globalbioethics.blogspot.com/ 
2008/01/ethics-of-research-on-neglected.html. 
 127. See Cairo Conference, supra note 22, Principle 5 (“Population-related goal and policies are 
integral parts of cultural, economic and social development, the principal aim of which is to improve 
the quality of life of all people.”). 
 128. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that U.S. birth rates reach a “replacement level” 
of 2.1 children per woman, distinguishing the United States from other industrialized states.  Russell 
Shorto, No Babies?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 29, 2008, at 36, 40, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/06/29/magazine/29Birth-t.html 
 129. State policies may focus on quality as well as quantity.  China, for example, has adopted 
“healthy birth” policies.  See Michael Palmer, Caring for Young and Old:  Developments in the Family 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1996-1998, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 95, 
101-02 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2000); XIN MAO, Chinese Geneticists’ Views of Ethical Issues in Genetic 
Testing and Screening: Evidence for Eugenics in China, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 688 (1998).  The U.S. 
program on eugenics in Cold Spring Harbor, New York was closed in 1938.  The facility now houses 
a major research program on genetic engineering.  PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO 
IMBECILES:  EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT AND BUCK V. BELL, 42-57 (2008) (discussing state-
sponsored sterilization in the twentieth century). 
 130. Janet Larsen, Iran’s Birth Rate Plummeting at Record Pace: Success Provides a Model for Other 
Developing Countries, EARTH POL’Y INST. (December 28, 2001), http://www.earth-policy.org/ 
plan_b_updates/2001/update4ss. 
 131. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop: Abortion in China, Germany, South 
Africa, and International Human Rights Law, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 287, 299 (2003); Eleonora Zielinska, 
European Socialist Countries, in ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS 241, 241 (George F. 
Cole & Stanislaw J. Frankowski eds., 1987) (explaining that liberalized abortion policies were the 
result of implementing the idea of equality between men and women in all aspects of life). 
 132. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 n.10 (2d Cir. 1995) (Plaintiffs claimed that defendants 
encouraged systematic mass rape to further “ethnic cleansing.”)  The forced impregnation would 
produce children of their fathers’ ethnicity. 
 133. As Susan Moller Okin  notes, this is not uncommon: 
Although the powerful drive to control women─and to blame and punish them for men’s 
difficulty in controlling their own sexual impulses─has been softened considerably in the 
more progressive reformed versions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, it remains strong 
in their more orthodox or fundamentalist versions.  Moreover, it is by no means confined 
to Western or monotheistic cultures.  Many of the world’s traditions and cultures, 
including those practiced within formerly conquered or colonized nation-states─which 
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Even if it has a legitimate interest, the state may not violate specific 
provisions of CEDAW, including the perpetuation of stereotypes barred by 
Article 5.134  The state interest may matter under the Civil Covenant or the 
Economic Covenant, both of which include provisions for derogation.135  But the 
Women’s Convention, like the Race Convention, which is also aimed at ending 
discrimination, does not provide for derogation.  Whatever the scarcity or 
emergency, the state cannot rectify it at the expense of the protected group.136 
In addition to the violation of specific provisions, the state can deny 
reproductive rights by any acts or omissions that effectively restrict a woman’s 
choice.137  This includes the state’s failure to enable women to make decisions 
independently of their husbands, families, and communities.  It also includes the 
failure to provide affordable pre-natal and maternal healthcare and childcare.  
As Professor Dorothy Roberts observes, this explains the often divergent 
concerns of American women: “The primary concern of white, middle-class 
women are laws that restrict choices otherwise available to them, such as 
statutes that make it more difficult to obtain an abortion.  The main concerns of 
poor women of color, however, are the material conditions of poverty and 
oppression that restrict their choices.”138  As Professor Roberts and others have 
shown, in the United States this has a long and ignominious history, beginning 
in slavery and continuing through the eugenics movement of the early twentieth 
 
certainly encompasses most of the peoples of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and 
Asia─are quite distinctly patriarchal. 
Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 
7, 14 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).  But see Homi K. Bhabha, Liberalism’s Sacred Cow, in IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra, at 79, 81-82 (“Okin’s ahistorical view of ‘patriarchy’ . . . 
and her monolithic, deterministic notion of culture itself . . . combine to form a dangerous 
presumption that many of the world’s other cultures . . . exist in a time warp . . . . Her version of 
liberal feminism shares something of the patronizing and stereotyping attitudes of the patriarchal 
perspective.”). 
 134. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 5. 
 135. See Civil Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 4; Economic Covenant, supra note 12, at arts. 4-5; 
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 207-08 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1999) (explaining 
derogation). 
 136. This is not to say that the rights set out in the Women’s Convention are guaranteed 
regardless of cost.  Implementation of the Women’s Convention, like that of all human rights 
treaties, may be constrained by a lack of resources.  But a lack of resources does not justify coerced 
abortion, sterilization, or childbirth.  A state might be unable to keep an infant with a severe 
infirmity alive, for example, but that would not justify forcing the mother to have an abortion.  Nor 
could a state refuse to allow abortions on the basis of cost, since a live birth ─and support of the 
resulting child─would cost even more.  See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 118, at 241 (noting that “[I]t is 
easier for an indigent woman to come up with the money for an abortion than for an indigent family 
to support a child for years.”). 
 137. See supra Part I.  This does not mean that the state has an affirmative obligation to enable 
“Octomom.”  Recall the language in the Proclamation of Teheran, supra note 21, referring to the 
“right to determine freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children” (emphasis 
added). 
 138. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1461 (1991).  See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, 
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 310 (2d ed. 2003). 
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century.139  More recently, it has surfaced in policies punishing pregnant 
addicts.140  Policies that punish poor women reproduce gender by signaling that 
women’s reproductive work is not valued.  Rather, the only alternative to 
poverty for women is to emulate men, becoming what Joan Williams describes 
as “ideal workers,” devoting themselves to their employers instead of their 
families.141 
A state preference for birth, like that of the state in Maher,142 violates 
CEDAW because it does not allow women to choose abortion unless they can 
pay for it.  Denying abortions to such women reproduces gender by forcing 
women to become mothers,143 requiring them to perform nine months of 
reproductive work, suffer pain, and assume the risks of childbirth.144  As a 
practical matter, moreover, it may well relegate them to the private sphere of the 
home and the family for much longer.  In the United States, as Professor Siegel 
explains: 
Hypothetically, a woman compelled to bear a child she does not want could 
give it up for adoption, abandon it, or pay someone to care for the child until 
maturity.  In this society, however, . . . few women are able to abandon a child 
 
 139. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 118; LOMBARDO, supra note 129; JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. 
SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2009). 
 140. See Roberts, supra note 138. 
 141. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 1-3 (2000) (explaining that becoming an “ideal worker” is next to impossible when one 
parent is responsible for most of the child and home care). 
 142. In Maher, the Supreme Court upheld a state law providing coverage for births, but not 
abortions.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469, 474 (1977) (holding that neither state nor federal 
government must pay for an indigent woman’s abortion).  Presumably, it would also uphold a state 
law covering both. 
 143. CHAMALLAS, supra note 138, at 309 (“Nevertheless, the ‘gender codes’ that put pressure on 
women to become mothers, to keep and raise their children, and to subordinate their professional 
and personal interests for family have not disappeared.”). 
 144. Gentler incentives, however, may be acceptable.  Many countries in Western Europe have 
policies intended to make procreation more appealing to women, by subsidizing their decision to 
have and raise a child.  A single mother in Denmark, for example, receives cash assistance, free 
kindergarten for her child, and subsidized housing.  See Katarina Tomasevski, Reproduction, Rights, 
and Reality: How Facts and Law Can Work for Women: European Approaches to Enhancing Reproductive 
Freedom, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1037 (1995).  Austrian parents, regardless of marital status, are entitled to 
a family allowance for each child in their household.  See The Clearinghouse on Int’l Devs. in Child, 
Youth, & Family Policies, What Do Other Countries Provide for Parents?, Issue Brief (Spring 2002) 2, 7 
(tbl. 1), available at http://www.childpolicyintl.org/issuebrief/ issuebrief5table1.pdf.  Mothers are 
entitled to a maternity allowance of eight weeks after giving birth, and either parent may elect to 
stay home to care for the child and receive a government-funded parental allowance.  Id.  Parents are 
entitled to achild care allowance, whether or not they are employed.  Id.  Norway provides single-
parent families with a universal family allowance and a birth grant for single mothers; the 
government also pays child support if the non-custodial parent defaults.  Dan Keeton, Progressive 
Social Policy in the Global Economy, THE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 1998.  See generally Shorto, supra note 128; 
Hans-Peter Kohler et al., The Emergence of Lowest-Low Fertility in Europe During the 1990s, 28 
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 641, 659 (2002) (noting “quite widespread agreement in the literature that 
lowest-low fertility countries share an institutional setting that implicitly favors a relatively low 
quantum of fertility.”); Davis & Withers, supra note 116, at 43 (describing a case in which the 
Supreme Court of India “upheld [a] ‘child cap’ for elective office, concluding that the paramount 
goal of population control overrode claims of fundamental rights”). 
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born of their body. . . .  Once compelled to bear a child against their wishes, 
most women will feel obligated to raise it.145 
Reproductive rights may also be denied by ostensibly neutral laws.  
Professor Carol Sanger has shown, for example, how safe haven laws146 and 
informed consent laws147 are intended to deter abortion.  Such laws reproduce 
gender “[b]y connecting infant life to unborn life and infanticide to abortion,” 
and motherhood to pregnancy, evoking powerful stereotypes “to promote the 
political goal of the culture of life: the reversal of Roe v. Wade.”148  Reproductive 
rights may be denied by the failure to carefully think through the actual, 
variable conditions of reproductive work.  Professor Joanna Grossman has 
shown, for example, how even well-intentioned legislation like the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act fails pregnant women by relying on a disability model.149  
Reproductive rights may be denied by the failure to maintain an environment in 
which they can be safely and freely exercised, where, for example, men control 
sex.150 
B.  Denial by Non-State Parties 
1.  Cultural Traditions and Religious Beliefs 
As the CEDAW Committee has pointed out: 
In all nations, the most significant factors inhibiting women’s ability to 
participate in public life have been the cultural framework of values and 
religious beliefs, the lack of services and men’s failure to share the tasks 
associated with the organization of the household and with the care and raising 
of children.  In all nations, cultural traditions and religious beliefs have played a 
part in confining women to the private spheres of activity and excluding them 
from active participation in public life.151 
 
 145. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 371-72 (1992); see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 138, 
at 305. 
 146. Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 
(2006). 
 147. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) (arguing that mandatory ultrasound intrudes upon what should be a 
“protected area of decisionmaking”). 
 148. Sanger, supra note 146, at 753. 
 149. See Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L. REV. 
567, 613-14 (2010); Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 15, 26-27 (2009). 
 150. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 94-95 (1987) (“Sexual intercourse, 
still the most common cause of pregnancy, cannot simply be presumed coequally determined.”); see 
also Celia W. Dugger, African Studies Give Women Hope in HIV Fights, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010 at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/07/20/world/africa/20safrica.html (describing a World Bank 
study in which poor schoolgirls in Malawi were given small monthly payments.  The research 
revealed that “[t]he likelihood that the girls would agree to sex in return for gifts and cash declined 
as the size of the payments from the program rose, suggesting the central role of extreme poverty in 
sexual choices.”). 
 151. General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 66. 
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Where such traditions and beliefs conflict with women’s reproductive 
rights, the issue is whether a woman can opt out.  This is not an issue where 
there is no legal capacity.  In the case of child marriages, for example, there is no 
ability to opt out because a child lacks the capacity to consent.152  Nor, under 
CEDAW, do girls have the capacity to consent to female genital surgeries 
(FGS),153 a range of practices involving total or partial removal of the external 
female genitalia.154  Each year, an estimated two million girls undergo 
excision.155  As noted by the non-government organization (NGO) PLAN, FGS is 
a cultural, rather than a religious practice, most common in sub-Saharan and 
Northeastern Africa and where immigrants from these areas re-settle.  It is 
viewed as part of a woman’s rite of passage into adulthood, and considered a 
prerequisite to marriage.  The purpose of FGS is to reproduce gender in the 
starkest form.  As PLAN observes, “the pain endured is seen as part of the girl’s 
education.  It is believed to change her into a respectful, calm, and less 
demanding person who accepts her role as a servant to her husband.”156 
The CEDAW Committee has carefully set out measures intended to 
eradicate the practice of FGS without triggering a backlash.157  In the Unites 
States, FGS on minors are illegal under federal law.158  While few condone the 
 
 152. See U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND [UNICEF], Early Marriage Child Spouses, INNOCENTI DIG. (Mar. 
2001), reprinted in BARBARA STARK, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 22, 25 (2005) (noting that although 
women are granted the right to consent to marriage by the law, “in a large number of countries, 
these legal provisions are merely symbolic”); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, New Life for the Pariahs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009, at WK10, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/11/01/opinion/01kristof.html 
(describing obstetric fistula, a childbirth injury suffered by teenagers in Africa and Asia whose 
pelvises are not fully grown, resulting in “steadily trickling urine and sometimes feces through their 
vagina[s],” a condition which can be correct by a $300 surgery). 
 153. The World Health Organization [WHO] and UNICEF refer to this practice as “female 
genital mutilation” (FGM).  WHO, FACT SHEET NO. 241 (2000), reprinted in STEINER ET. AL., supra note 
55, at 546.  The CEDAW Committee refers to it as “female circumcision.”  See, e.g., CEDAW, Female 
Circumcision, General Recommendation No. 14, 9th Sess., 1990, U.N. Doc. A/45/38/1, Nov. 1, 1994 
[hereinafter General Recommendation No. 14] (recommending that States parties “[t]ake appropriate 
and effective measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 548. 
 156. Id. at 549.  The West, too, has a long, miserable and recent history of punishing and 
exploiting women and girls for their sexuality.  See, e.g., THE MAGDALENE SISTERS (Miramax 2002) 
(depicting the Magdalene Laundries, where Irish girls who had sex before marriage, or were 
suspected of having sex before marriage, or were raped, were sent for indefinite sentences of manual 
labor to “cleanse themselves of their sins,” until the 1990s); Kate Taylor, Artist’s Daughter Seeks 
Return of Nude Video, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at C1, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/08/arts/design/08rivers.html (describing demands of New York artist Larry Rivers’ 
daughter, Emma, for the return of nude videos taken of her by her father when she was an 
adolescent). 
 157. General Recommendation No. 14, supra note 154, (recommending that States parties “[t]ake 
appropriate and effective measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision.”); 
see also, e.g., UNICEF, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION/CUTTING 28-29 (2005), available at http:// 
www.unicef.org/ publications/files/FGM-C_final_10_October.pdf (noting that prevalence and 
attitudes are slowly changing in response to culturally-sensitive, country-specific programs). 
 158. Female Genital Mutilation, 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (providing in pertinent part; “whoever 
knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia 
minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”); see also Op-Ed, Not Anyone’s Daughter, N.Y. 
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practice, many have criticized Western condemnation as paternalistic and 
heavy-handed.159  This is an instructive reminder that the reproduction of 
gender is often contested and problematic, and that women themselves are often 
deeply invested in it.160 
Where the adult woman considers her religion161 or her cultural 
community162 more important than her right to bear a child or to terminate a 
pregnancy—that is her choice.  If a woman chooses not to use birth control in 
accordance with her religious beliefs, for example, it is not necessarily a denial 
of reproductive rights.  If, however, she is effectively barred from such a 
decision, it is.  In some cases this is clear cut,163 but in many cases it is not.  Many 
 
TIMES, July 1, 2010, at A30, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/opinion/01thu4.html (urging 
passage of legislation that would make it a felony to take a girl out of the country to have female 
genital surgery and suggesting “that ports of entry like Kennedy International Airport in New York 
City have informational signs, hot lines and a shelter . . . to save a girl from a lifetime of suffering 
and early death”). 
 159. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Between Irua and “Female Genital Mutilation”: Feminist Human Rights 
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.  1 (1995); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant 
Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 197-202 (1992). 
 160. See, e.g., Aida Seif El Dawla et al., Women’s Wit Over Men’s: Trade-offs and Strategic 
Accommodations in Egyptian Women’s Reproductive Lives, in NEGOTIATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra 
note 30, at 69 (noting the “dilemma [facing researchers] when certain traditions that we ourselves 
perceive as harmful or degrading for women received a very different response from many of the 
women we interviewed”); see also, Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of 
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1568-69 (1991) (explaining the internalization of subordination by 
women in the West). 
 161. Rishona Fleishman, Comment, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: The Impact of the 
Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 
308 (2000) (explaining that the Catholic Church’s present anti-abortion position “was started by Pope 
Pius IX in 1854 during his ‘affirmation of the immaculate conception of Mary, which elevated the 
status of women─particularly the “sacredness” of their child-bearing role in church dogma”’); see also 
id. at 283 (“The influence of the Catholic Church on reproductive rights is international . . . . The 
Catholic Church is the only religion with a permanent observer seat in the United Nations . . . . As an 
observer, the Holy See sends representatives to the United Nations and to conferences sponsored by 
the United Nations.”).  See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 18 (“The globalized conflicts over 
women’s rights and religious authority that are playing out across the developing world have led to 
political realignments that complicate the simpler left/right divides of the Cold War years.”). 
 162. Abdullah An Na’im questions whether: 
 [liberal]  theorists … have a clear understanding of the meaning of cultural membership 
in a minority culture in Western societies, as a daily existential experience … [i]f they 
encourage young women to repudiate the integrity and cohesion of their own minority 
culture, how can the theorists then help to sustain the identity and human dignity of those 
women? 
Abdullah An-na’im, Promises We Should All Keep in Common Cause, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR 
WOMEN?, supra note 133, at 59. 
 163. Where, for example, she faces serious physical sanctions ─ such as stoning─ from which the 
state either cannot or will not protect her, she has no real choice.  If the sanction is moral or social, on 
the other hand, the question is whether, as a practical matter, women can opt out.  As Dixon-Mueller 
puts it, “Religious values and social norms designed to limit the right to use any or all methods of 
fertility regulation such as artificial contraception or abortion may be freely accepted by individuals 
but cannot be imposed on those who choose not to accept such values and norms.” DIXON-MUELLER, 
supra note 28, at 14. 
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states, for example, allow religious laws, presumably including religious laws 
regarding reproduction, to govern marriage.164 
The determination whether or not she has a real choice, however difficult, 
must be considered from the individual woman’s perspective.  For an outsider 
to conclude that she suffers from ‘false consciousness’165 assumes a superiority 
that itself reproduces gender.  As Professor Homi Bhabha explains: 
[The] norm of Western liberalism becomes at once the measure and mentor of 
minority cultures─Western liberalism, warts and all, as a salvage operation, if 
not salvation itself.  With a zealousness not unlike the colonial civilizing 
mission, the ‘liberal’ agenda is articulated without a shadow of self-doubt, 
except perhaps an acknowledgment of its contingent failings in the practice of 
everyday life.166 
As Katha Politt observes, however: “In its demand for equality for women, 
feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually every culture on earth.  You could 
say that multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural traditions, while 
feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural  traditions.”167  Thus, the 
question of the individual woman’s own choice, from her perspective, must 
itself be unpacked.  Has she had access to education, including the ‘family 
education’ required under CEDAW,168 so that she is aware of the parameters of 
that choice?  The key to CEDAW’s approach to cultural and religious challenges 
is in Article 10, which requires states to assure women equal “access to 
studies . . .in educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as 
urban areas” from pre-school through adulthood.169  This includes, it should be 
recalled, the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children.170  Article 10 addresses the 
content of education, requiring the state to “eliminate any stereotyped concept of 
 
 164. See, e.g., Frances Raday, Israel - The Incorporation of Religious Patriarchy in a Modern State, in 4 
INT'L REV. COMP. PUB. POL’Y 209 (1992); Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage 
Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 989 
(1998) (noting that South Africa, India, Egypt, Great Britain, and Israel all allow religious laws to 
govern marriage).  Whether─ ─and when a woman can opt out of such marriages poses complicated 
legal questions, which few women have the resources to resolve.  Some of the larger political 
cultures in which such religious laws are allowed are more supportive than others.  See, e.g., Siegel, 
The De Facto ERA, supra note 10, at 1330 (explaining how “constitutional culture channels social 
movement conflict”). 
 165. Cass Sunstein refers to: 
internalized norms of subordination.  The remedy of “exit”’─ the right of women to leave 
a religious order─is crucial, but it will not be sufficient when girls have been taught in 
such a way as to be unable to scrutinize the practices with which they have grown up.  
People’s “preferences”─itself an ambiguous term─ need not be respected when they are 
adaptive to unjust background conditions; in such circumstances it is not even clear 
whether the relevant preferences are authentically “theirs.” 
Cass R. Sunstein, Should Sex Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions? in IS MULTICULTURALISM 
BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 133, at 85, 88. 
 166. Bhabha, supra note 128, at 83. 
 167. Katha Politt, Whose Culture?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 133, at 
27. 
 168. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 169. CEDAW, supra note 2, at art. 10(a). 
 170. Id. at art. 5. 
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the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education.”171  The 
drafters honed this provision carefully to make it as clear and forceful as 
possible.  The U.S. delegate, supported by the UNESCO observer, suggested that 
“stress be given to early or career education of children in order to eliminate sex-
stereotyped roles and images.”172  Even if children attend religious schools, or 
are home-schooled,173 under CEDAW gender equality must be part of the 
curriculum. 
Equally important, a woman cannot freely exercise reproductive rights as a 
practical matter if she is economically or socially dependent on her cultural 
community, or if she would not have a place to live or work outside of it.  Thus, 
whether a woman truly enjoys reproductive rights cannot be ascertained 
without considering whether she can freely exercise other rights.  Just as other 
rights depend upon reproductive rights for their realization, reproductive rights 
depend upon them.174 
2.  Husbands, Partners, and Parents 
As noted above,175 CEDAW breaks new ground in human rights law by 
explicitly assuring women’s rights in the private sphere of the family.  CEDAW 
recognizes that even where reproductive rights are legally assured by the state, 
as a practical matter they may be denied within the family.  A husband or 
partner can violate a woman’s reproductive rights, reproducing gender in the 
process, in any number of ways, from rape, to physically preventing her from 
using contraception,176 to forcing her to obtain an abortion by threatening her, to 
simply shirking childcare responsibilities.  A girl’s parents, similarly, may 
prevent her from obtaining family education and access to reproductive health 
care.177 
The legal effect is the same as if the denial of rights were attributable to the 
state, and gender is reproduced in the same way.  American law addresses this 
 
 171. Id. at art. 10(c).  This includes “coeducation and other types of education which will help to 
achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the 
adaptation of teaching methods.”  Id. 
 172. REHOF, supra note 43, at 117. 
 173. Timothy Brandon Waddell, Note, Bring It All Back Home: Establishing a Coherent 
Constitutional Framework for the Re-regulation of Homeschooling, 63 VAND. L. REV. 541 (2010) 
(suggesting parameters for regulating homeschooling). 
 174. Such interdependence is commonplace in international human rights.  See, e.g., Indivisibility 
and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. 
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/130 (Dec. 15, 1989) (noting 
interdependence of the rights set out in the International Bill of Rights); see also supra Part I.B 
(describing CEDAW’s comprehensive approach to women’s rights.)  It also resonates with the 
critiques of 14th Amendment equality by American feminists.  See, e.g., infra Part III.B.2. 
 175. See supra Part I.C. 
 176. ABORTION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 31-32 (Axel I. Mundigo & Cynthia Indriso eds., 1999) 
(discussing societies in which men oppose women’s use of contraception). 
 177. CEDAW does not assure minors a right to engage in sexual activity, but it does require a 
state to provide a minor with education and healthcare.  See, e.g., General Recommendation No. 24, 
supra note 33. 
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by providing for judicial override, at least in the case of abortion.178  That is, a 
girl whose parents will not allow her to obtain an abortion, or who swears that 
she cannot ask them (because, for example, her father has impregnated her) can 
nevertheless obtain an abortion with the approval of a judge.179  As Professor 
Martin Guggenheim explains, however, this is usually a partial and inadequate 
solution.180  CEDAW contemplates a more comprehensive approach, but leaves 
the details of implementation to the states. 
III.  HOW THIS PLAYS OUT 
International law, for the most part, has been made by men, for men—
historically, politically, structurally, and normatively.181  The idea that 
reproductive rights are women’s human rights is very recent.  The extent to 
which states have recognized these rights, albeit rhetorically, is remarkable.  
That the resultant consensus is not on a par with freedom from torture is not.  
Nor is the gap between the law as written and the law as applied. 
This does not mean, however, that the United States should join the list of 
hypocritical states that have ratified CEDAW with no intention of actually 
complying.  Again, I am not arguing here that the United States should ratify 
CEDAW; but if we do, we should do so in good faith.  The first section of this 
Part explains what CEDAW requires and why implementation remains 
problematic under international law.  The second section explains why the 
United States should ratify CEDAW as a congressional-executive agreement.  It 
concludes by describing how this would affect reproductive rights in the United 
States. 
A.  In International Law 
1. What CEDAW Requires 
The actual “elimination of all forms of discrimination against women” 
remains a radical proposition, promising a world we can scarcely imagine.182  
But that is precisely the proposition to which states have consented by ratifying 
CEDAW.  Since the denial of reproductive rights reproduces gender, by 
ratifying CEDAW states have agreed to assure reproductive rights, whether or 
 
 178. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 502 (1990); Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 427 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding 
parental notice and consent requirements). 
 179. Hodgson, supra note 179, at 427. 
 180. Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 
632-36 (2002). 
 181. As a leading human rights text notes, “Of the several blind spots in the early development 
of the human rights movement, none is as striking as that movement’s failure to give violations of 
women’s (human) rights, the attention [and] the priority . . . they require.”  STEINER ET AL., supra note 
55, at 175; see also ERIKSSON, supra note 6, at 3.  But see HENKIN ET AL., supra note 135, at 358 (noting 
that, “international human rights law has, from the outset, applied to men and women equally”).  
For an account of early efforts to internationalize women’s rights, see Fraser, supra note 6, at 878 
(describing convention in 1902 in Washington, D.C., which included delegates from the United 
States, England, Russia, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Australia, Chile, and Canada). 
 182. See CEDAW, supra note 2. 
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not that was their original intention.183  In fact, because the denial of these rights 
perpetuates the core stereotypes that CEDAW was drafted to eradicate, such 
denial is incompatible with CEDAW’s “object and purpose.”184 
While a sovereign state cannot be bound without its consent, ratifying 
states consented to CEDAW and Articles 2, 5, and 16 are unambiguous.185  Just 
as the United States is liable under the Geneva Conventions186 and the 
Convention Against Torture187 (notwithstanding its subsequent insistence that 
water boarding was not in fact torture),188 once a state promises to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination against women it cannot later argue that this does not 
require the assurance of reproductive rights. 
Article 28.2 of CEDAW prohibits any “reservation incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the present Convention.”189  Reservations by states that 
effectively deny reproductive rights, accordingly, should not be allowed.190  In 
fact, under the reasoning of the ICJ in The Reservations to the Genocide Convention 
 
 183. The conservatives in the U.S. Senate who added “sex” as a prohibited form of 
discrimination to Title VII in an effort to assure its defeat similarly found themselves bound when it 
passed.  MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1283-84 (noting that “sex discrimination in private 
employment was forbidden under federal law only in a last minute joking . . .attempt to defeat Title 
VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination.  [Sex absurdum] failed and the law passed anyway.”). 
 184. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90 (explaining the significance of this term in the 
instant  context). 
 185. Even if there were any ambiguity, under Article 32 of the VCLT this would merely permit 
recourse to supplemental materials, such as the Travaux.  But there are no qualifications regarding 
reproductive rights in the Travaux.  On the contrary, the states (including the United States) seem to 
be vying with each other to strengthen the norm against discrimination.  See, e.g., REHOF, supra note 
43, at 52-61.  Morocco’s modest attempt to temper the reference to “customs and practices” in 2(f) by 
the addition of “in their view,” for example, was overwhelmingly rejected.  Id. at 60. 
 186. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. 
 187. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, Dec. 10, 
1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51; see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, America and the World, 2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 313, 318 (Jack M. Balkin & 
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (noting that the Hamdan Court treated Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions as a “binding . . .universal treaty obligation”). 
 188. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President 35, 39 (Aug. 1 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
wp/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf (asserting that Congress could not constitutionally regulate the 
interrogation of battlefield combatants).  But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 611-13 (2006) 
(determining military commissions set up at Guantanamo violate Geneva Conventions); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding U.S. citizen could not be held indefinitely as enemy 
combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding U.S. courts have jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo.); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding fundamental rights apply at 
Guantanamo). 
 189. This incorporates Article 19(c) of the VCLT, supra note 4.  The United States is not a party to 
the VCLT, but accepts it as binding customary international law.  MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 307 (3d ed. 2006). 
 190. See VCLT, supra note 4, at art. 19(c). 
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Case,191 it could be argued that states that deny reproductive rights should not be 
considered parties to CEDAW.192  This is supported by the CEDAW 
Committee’s Statement on Reservations,193 in which it confirms that Articles 2 
and 16 of the Convention are “core provisions of the Convention” to which 
reservations are impermissible.  Denial of reproductive rights violates both.194 
As the Statement on Reservations further notes, the CEDAW Committee is 
“particularly concerned at the number and extent of reservations entered to 
those articles.”195  Several other state parties to the Convention have objected to 
these reservations on this ground.196  These states have not said that they do not 
consider the reserving party a party to the treaty, which a state may do when it 
views a reservation as incompatible.  Rather, they accept the reserving party as a 
party to the treaty, presumably for reasons similar to those articulated in the 
Genocide Case.  There, notwithstanding reservations to which some states 
objected, they recognized the “intention of the General Assembly and of the 
[adopting states] that as many states as possible should participate [given the 
Genocide Convention’s purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose.]”197  The 
CEDAW Committee takes a similar approach.198 
2. What Actually Happens 
On the domestic level, every state determines the scope of its own 
obligations under CEDAW.  While this is subject to the CEDAW Committee’s 
monitoring, the Committee has no enforcement powers.  Rather, enforcement in 
 
 191. 1951 I.C.J. 31, 1951 WL 3 (May 28). 
 192. Again, it is not my argument that this is the best strategy to further women’s rights.  See 
supra Introduction.  Rather, it is my argument that because the denial of reproductive rights is 
fundamentally incompatible with CEDAW, refusing to recognize states that deny those rights as  
parties to CEDAW is allowed under the Opinion. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28). 
 193. CEDAW Committee, Rep. of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions), U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 at pt. 2 ¶¶ 1-25 (1998) 
(statements on reservations). 
 194. See supra Part II.B; see also ERIKSSON, supra note 6, at 146 n.903 (arguing that Article 16 is 
central to reproductive freedom). 
 195. CEDAW Committee, supra note 193, at pt. 2 ¶ 6.  As of July 2007, thirty-seven states had 
entered reservations with respect to articles 2, 16 or other core obligations. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 
135, at 820; see also General Recommendation No. 21, ¶ 41 (“The Committee has noted with alarm the 
number of States parties which have entered reservations to the whole or part of article 16, especially 
when a reservation has also been entered to article 2, claiming that compliance may conflict with a 
commonly held vision of the family based, inter alia, on cultural or religious beliefs or on the 
country's economic or political status.”); id. ¶ 42 (“Many of these countries hold a belief in the 
patriarchal structure of a family which places a father, husband or son in a favourable  position. In 
some countries where fundamentalist or other extremist views or economic hardships have 
encouraged a return to old values and traditions, women's place in the family has deteriorated 
sharply.”). 
 196. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 135, at 822 (noting that Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom have been among the objecting 
states). 
 197. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28). 
 198. See CEDAW Committee, supra note 193, at pt. 2 ¶¶ 1-25 ; see also Belinda Clark, The Vienna 
Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 
281, 282 (1991). 
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domestic courts generally provides the most effective remedy, where it is 
available.  Some countries, such as the Netherlands, adopt international human 
rights treaties as domestic law upon ratification.  In these states, women would 
be able to bring suit in their own courts if they were denied their reproductive 
rights.199  In some of these states, reproductive rights are already assured under 
domestic law.  In others, however, those seeking to further these rights have 
successfully drawn on CEDAW.  For example, a May 2006 decision by the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia cited CEDAW when it determined that 
abortion should not be considered a crime in all circumstances (such as rape, 
incest, or when the life of the mother is in danger).200 
Since there is no international Supreme Court to resolve conflicting 
opinions, the interpretations and remedies of the national domestic courts may 
vary considerably.  This ‘fragmentation’ of international law is a growing 
concern among international lawyers.  As set out in the Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Fragmentation of International Law (“ILC 
Report”), international law is losing coherence, certainty, and predictability 
because it lacks dependable mechanisms for reconciling inconsistencies.201 
This fragmentation is exacerbated by the practice of some states, including 
the United States, which do not always automatically incorporate treaties.  
Although such states may have ratified the Women’s Convention, accordingly, 
it is not enforceable as domestic law.  This means that women in these states 
cannot claim their rights under CEDAW in their national courts.202 
Nor is there any international tribunal before which women may do so.  
The ICJ only hears contentious cases between states.203  While the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) has jurisdiction over rape and coerced pregnancy 
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack,” this drastically limits 
 
 199. Where domestic courts do enforce CEDAW as part of domestic law, however, they should 
fully assure reproductive rights.  As MacKinnon explains, this necessarily 
include[s] the abortion right but [does] not center on it . . . . Women who are assaulted and 
miscarry, women who are forced to have abortions and women who are denied abortions, 
women who are sterilized, and women who are negligently attended at birth all suffer 
deprivation of reproductive control [as do women subject to] . . .  nonconsensual 
sterilization, forced obstetrical intervention, supervision of women’s activities during 
pregnancy under the criminal law, and denials of abortion through criminalization or lack 
of public funding where needed. 
MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1318-19. 
 200. BLANCHFIELD, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Ioana Ardelean, An Ominous Sampling of 
International Efforts to Force Abortion on Reluctant Nations, CULTURE OF LIFE FOUND., http://culture-of-
life.org//content/view/497/1/). Excerpts from the Colombian Court’s decision (C- 355/2006) are 
available at ttp://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/pdf_pubs/pub_c3552006.pdf. 
 201. Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
 202. According to the CEDAW Committee, the failure to provide “an effective judicial” remedy 
constitutes a violation of Article 12.  General Recommendation No. 24, supra note 33, ¶ 13. 
 203. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1062, 1 
U.N.T.S. 16. 
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the rapes and pregnancies over which it has jurisdiction.204  The ICC is a 
criminal tribunal, moreover.  Its objective is to punish and deter crimes, not to 
further reproductive rights.  ‘Horizontal’ legal process is usually a factor in 
international compliance, but it is conspicuously absent in human rights.  That 
is, if a state fails to meet its obligations toward other states, those states typically 
refuse to meet their reciprocal obligations.  But states rarely pressure other states 
to treat their women fairly.205  People who live in glass houses do not throw 
stones. 
An Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention enables individual 
women to file complaints before the CEDAW Committee.206  This is only an 
option for women whose states have ratified the Protocol.  Even in such cases, 
the Committee’s enforcement powers remain limited.  In sum, although states 
assume significant obligations under CEDAW, it costs them very little because 
of the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms. 
B.  In the United States 
If the United States ratifies CEDAW, it should do so in good faith, and 
commit to its unqualified implementation.  This may seem obvious to those 
unfamiliar with our long and shameful history of shirking international human 
rights obligations.  This section will first explain how the United States can ratify 
CEDAW while complying with international as well as domestic law.  It 
concludes by analyzing CEDAW’s impact on existing domestic law governing 
reproductive rights. 
1.  Ratifying CEDAW as a Congressional-Executive Treaty 
Historically, ratification of international human rights treaties has been 
opposed by those who feared that the federal government would use 
international law to limit states’ rights.  The United States was eager to declare 
its support for international human rights after World War II, and recognized 
the need for other states to guarantee them.207  But the United States was less 
eager to invite scrutiny of its own practices, especially racial segregation in the 
American South.208 
 
 204. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183 (July 1, 
2002).  See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
 205. See generally CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 13. 
 206. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Oct. 15, 1999, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/54/4, 39 I.L.M. 281; see, e.g., Heidi Gilchrist, Note, The Optional Protocol to the Women’s 
Convention: An Argument for Ratification, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 769 (2001). 
 207. DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (1991) (From 1945 
until 1952, “the United States was determined to keep Charter language limited to vague 
generalities, resisting most of the efforts of smaller states and private groups in favor of more 
specific and demanding obligations.”). 
 208. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1988) 
(“U.S. government officials realized that their ability to sell democracy to the Third World was 
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”). 
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While the executive branch was concerned about the international reaction 
to domestic practices,209 the Senate was more concerned about the domestic 
reaction to international law-making, as revealed in the debate in the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Genocide Conventions: “If there is to be 
a succession of treaties from the United Nations dealing with domestic 
questions, are we ready to surrender the power of the States over such matters 
to the Federal Government?”210  Many in Congress were emphatically not 
“ready to surrender the power of the states over . . . to the federal 
government”—and certainly not to the U.N. 
Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an amendment to the United States 
Constitution which would require an Act of Congress before any human rights 
treaty could become law in the United States.211  The Eisenhower administration 
was able to defeat the Bricker Amendment, but only by promising not to ratify 
any human rights treaties.212  It was not until 1992, after the end of the Cold War, 
and any possible claim that ratification might give the Soviets an advantage, that 
the United States finally ratified the Civil Covenant.213  Even then, it did so with 
reservations, understandings and declarations (“RUDs”) that ensure that the 
Civil Covenant cannot be relied on in U.S. courts,214 and that it adds nothing to 
rights already assured under existing domestic law.215  As Harold Koh has 
observed, we remain wary: “In the cathedral of human rights, the United States 
is more like a flying buttress than a pillar—choosing to stand outside the 
international structure supporting the international human rights system, but 
 
 209. Vicki Goldberg, Remembering the Faces in the Civil Rights Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, at 
H31, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/17/arts/ photography-view-remembering-the-faces-in-
the-civil-rights-struggle.html (noting that “[t]he Kennedy administration was extremely worried 
about damage to this nation's image abroad.  Well it might have been: the Soviet Union broadcast 
1,420 anti-American commentaries linked to the troubles in Birmingham in 1963” and “pictures of 
dogs and fire hoses were published in Europe, Africa, India, Japan.  Photographs were especially 
powerful in countries where large parts of the population could not read.”). 
 210. The Genocide Convention: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 81st Cong., 206, 208 (1950) (statement of Carl B. Rix, Vice Chairman of Special Committee 
on Peace and Law Through United Nations, American Bar Association).  For an excellent overview 
of the efforts to apply the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter in state and federal United 
States courts from 1946 to 1955, see Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States 
Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984). 
 211. S.J. Res. 1, 83rd Cong., 99 Cong. Rec. 6777, 6777 (1953). 
 212. LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 964-65 (1973). 
 213. See Civil Covenant, supra note 12. 
 214. See, e.g., Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Covenant On Civil and Political 
Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) (“[T]he [Civil] Covenant will not create a private cause 
of action in U.S. courts.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (1995); Lori Fisler Damrosch,  The Role of the United States Senate 
Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 522 (1991) 
(“U.S. law taken as a whole (that is, considering federal and state laws in their totality) already 
complied with the Torture Convention, and only minimal gaps were identified to be filled by 
implementing legislation.”); see also Catherine Redgwell, U.S. Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: 
All for One and None for All? in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 392, 393 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003). 
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without being willing to subject its own conduct to the scrutiny of that 
system.”216 
This arguably leaves the United States in violation of international law, 
since the failure to implement a treaty on the domestic level does not relieve a 
state of its obligations under international law.217  The Obama Administration 
promises a new approach.  Ratification of the Women’s Covenant as a 
congressional-executive treaty would be a good start.  Congressional-executive 
treaties, which must be approved by a simple majority of the Senate and the 
House, have long served as a practical alternative to Article II treaties, requiring 
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.  As Professor Oona Hathaway points 
out, congressional-executive treaties are generally recognized as interchangeable 
with Article II treaties218 among scholars219 as well as lawmakers.220  
Congressional-executive agreements avoid the political impasse often triggered 
by Article II’s supermajority requirement.  They also have the advantage of what 
Professor Hathaway calls “one-stop shopping;”221 that is, they are presumed to 
be self-executing under the Supremacy Clause.222  Thus, they enable the United 
States to avoid debacles like the decision in Medallin v. Texas,223 in which the 
Supreme Court held that Texas law trumped U.S. international obligations 
because the treaties on which those obligations were based were non-self-
executing.224 
 
 216. Harold Koh, The Future of Lou Henkin’s Human Rights Movement, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 487, 490 (2007).  Scholars have long urged the United States to participate in international 
human rights treaty regimes.  See, e.g., MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN’S 
LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 50-63 (1987); David 
Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN L. REV. 35, 66-72 (1978). 
 217. VCLT, supra note 4, at art. 46; see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 
(1988) (explaining that the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties is 
entirely a judicially created notion and is inconsistent with the text of the U.S. Constitution). 
 218. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in 
the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1245-47 (2008);  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 303 (1987) (reporters’ note 8).  “[I]n principle, a Congressional-Executive agreement must be 
within the powers of the President and Congress.”  Id. § 303 (reporters’ note 7) (emphasis added). 
 219. Hathaway, supra note 218, at 1245-47 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed. 1996)).  But see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1252-
54 (1995) (arguing that congressional-executive treaties allow Congress more power than the 
Constitution permits). 
 220. Hathaway, supra note 218, at 1247 (noting that the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the treaties establishing the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions were all 
congressional-executive treaties). 
 221. Id. at 1321. 
 222. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 40 (1829) (explaining that in the United States, unlike other 
common law states, treaties function like federal law, unless this is not feasible in the case of a 
particular treaty). 
 223. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 224. Id. (holding U.S. obligations were set out by the I.C.J. in Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12); see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties As Law of the 
Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) 
(explaining why the presumption that treaties are self-executing endures after Medellin).  But see John 
C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (arguing that non-self-executing treaties are not at odds with the 
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In addition, as Professor Hathaway demonstrates, congressional-executive 
agreements are more “democratically legitimate.”225  They involve more elected 
representatives, including representatives from the more democratic chamber.226  
In fact, most nation states only require a simple majority to enter into an 
international agreement.227  Finally, she suggests, the method she proposes for 
doing so is “both legally unproblematic and politically feasible.  It is, as a 
mechanical matter, breathtakingly simple. . . . All that is necessary to end the use 
of the Article III process is for the President to cease proposing agreements as 
Article II treaties and instead to propose them as congressional-executive 
agreements.”228   
Assuming that the United States ratifies the Women’s Convention, as set 
out above, the analysis set out in III.A. In International Law,229 would apply to the 
United States as well as to any other state party.230  In the alternative, domestic 
legislation would be necessary if the United States were to meet its international 
obligations because the Women’s Convention would not create a private right of 
action in the U.S. courts.231   In either case, CEDAW would effectively be 
incorporated in U.S. law.232  The result, for present purposes, would be national 
law, binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause,233 barring the 
reproduction of gender in connection with reproductive rights. 
2.  How CEDAW Would Affect Existing Law 
This section explains how CEDAW would alter existing law.  Under the 
Supremacy Clause, a treaty is as authoritative as federal law,234 subject only to 
 
Constitution); John C. Yoo, Rejoinder:  Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense 
of Non-Self Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) (setting out textual argument for non-self-
execution).  See generally David J. Bederman, Agora: Medellin: Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty 
Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (2008) (offering a scholarly range of views). 
 225. Hathaway, supra note 218, at 1337. 
 226. Id. at 1280. 
 227. Id. at 1272. 
 228. Id. at 1352 (suggesting that although this practice should replace the current practice, this 
need not be a rigid position.  If, because of the composition of the Senate or the House, obtaining the 
support of a supermajority of the Senate is more feasible, an Article II treaty remains an option for 
the President.). 
 229. See supra Part III.A. 
 230. See supra Introduction. 
 231. See supra note 214.  The United States has not enacted such legislation in connection with the 
Civil Covenant or the Race Convention, both of which it has ratified. 
 232. This assumes, perhaps too optimistically, that the United States would comply with 
international law.  In fact, the reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”) already 
drafted in connection with U.S. ratification of CEDAW suggest otherwise.  See Treaty Doc. 96-53; 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979 and Signed on Behalf of the United States of America 
on July 17, 1980: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 17 (2002); see JANET 
BENSHOOF, GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW COULD RADICALLY CHANGE THE 
DEFINITION OF GENDER EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: CEDAW AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 4-6 
(2008), available at http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/projects/us-foreign-policy/ 
CEDAWReproductiveRights.pdf (arguing that ratification of the “gutted” CEDAW would be 
disastrous). 
 233. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 234. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 40 (1829). 
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the “restraints of the Constitution.”235  As noted above, the Supreme Court has 
held that reproductive rights in the United States are protected under the Ninth 
Amendment’s right to privacy.236  CEDAW would not change this.  It would, 
however, provide a further basis for reproductive rights. 
CEDAW would establish a comprehensive federal floor for the national 
assurance of reproductive rights, including education, access to contraception 
and medical care, and the full panoply of rights set out above.237  We currently 
have no national floor because the United States does not recognize affirmative 
reproductive rights.  As noted above, the United States does not even recognize 
the human right to health.238  Instead, American women enjoy only the 
reproductive rights they can afford.  As Professor Law points out: 
More U.S. women confront unintended pregnancy than women in nearly every 
other developed country. One reason is that most employment-based health 
insurance programs in the United States exclude payment for contraceptives 
from otherwise comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs and medical 
services.239 
Under CEDAW, all American women would have access to contraception, 
which would probably limit the need for abortion.  Although data indicate that 
the majority of American women who have had abortions said that they were 
using contraceptives when they became pregnant,240 the recent developments of 
an after-sex pill that can prevent pregnancy if taken within five days of 
intercourse241 may further reduce the number of abortions sought.242  The use of 
 
 235. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (holding that a treaty could not abrogate the right to a 
jury trial).  But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 
YALE L.J. 1762, 1806 (2009) (arguing that the “power to say what [international] law is” resides 
exclusively in the U.S. government). 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
 237. See supra note 199. 
 238. See supra note 30. 
 239. Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 363 
(1998). 
 240. Balkin, supra note 10, at 5. 
 241. Gardiner Harris, Panel Recommends Approval of After-Sex Pill to Prevent Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2010, at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/06/18/health/policy/18pill.html (noting 
“dispute [as to] whether the [new] drug works by delaying ovulation . . . or by preventing a 
fertilized egg from implanting itself in the uterus); Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Another Pill That 
Could Cause a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at WK8, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/01/opinion/01kristof.html (describing misoprostol); Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion 
Providers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 14, 2010, at 30, 44, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/ 
18/magazine/ 18abortion-t.html (noting that “almost 90 percent of the abortions in the U.S. are 
performed before 12 weeks; in addition, four years ago, the proportion of procedures performed 
before 9 weeks reached 62 percent”). 
    The morning-after pill, which is not a form of abortion, has been available for many years.  See, e.g., 
Editorial, Respect for Women in Uniform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A20, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15mon3.html (commending Pentagon’s decision to make 
morning-after emergency contraception available to women in the military and criticizing remaining 
rules making abortions available only in cases of rape, incest, or when women’s lives are 
endangered, and requiring women to pay for such abortions). 
 242. Harris, supra note 241 (citing the Office of Population Research at Princeton University: 
“more than one million women who do not want to get pregnant are estimated to have unprotected 
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teleconferencing to enable women in the first nine weeks of pregnancy to obtain 
prescriptions for abortion pills,243 moreover, may reduce the number of surgical, 
as opposed to medical abortions.244  American abortion law, however, would 
also be affected.245 
CEDAW would supersede, rather than overrule, the line of cases beginning 
with Griswold246 and including Eisenstadt,247 Roe v. Wade,248 Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,249 and Gonzalez v. Carhart.250  That is, 
reproductive rights, including the right to contraception and abortion, would no 
longer be grounded exclusively in Ninth Amendment privacy.  Rather, these 
rights would also be protected by CEDAW’s broad and powerful bar on the 
reproduction of gender.251 
The privacy rationale for reproductive rights has been criticized since it 
was articulated.  As Professor Linda McClain observes: “[P]rivacy connotes 
female seclusion and subordination, leading to women’s under-participation in 
society and vulnerability to violence in the home.”252  These concerns are 
particularly pertinent in the context of reproductive rights.  As Justice O’Connor 
noted in striking Pennsylvania’s spousal notification law in Casey: 
[T]here are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular 
physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands.  Should these 
women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to 
inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion.  Many may have 
justifiable fears of physical abuse . . . .  Many may fear devastating forms of 
psychological abuse.253 
 
sex every night in the United States, and more than 25,000 become pregnant every year after being 
sexually assaulted.  Half of all pregnancies in the United States are unintended . . . ,”). 
 243. Monica Davey, Abortion Drugs Given in Iowa Via Video Link, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/health/policy/ 09video.html (noting that 1500 abortions 
have been performed in Iowa using teleconferencing equipment at sixteen Iowa clinics since June 
2008). 
 244. Bazelon, supra note 241, at 46 (noting that “Abortion remains the most common surgical 
procedure for American women; one-third of them will have one by the age of 45.  The number 
performed annually in the U.S. has largely held steady: 1.3 million in 1977 and 1.2 million three 
decades later.”). 
 245. See supra Part III.A. 
 246. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 247. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 248. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that under the Ninth Amendment protection of privacy, women 
had a right to abortion subject to the state’s interest in protecting the developing fetus). 
 249. 505 U.S. 833, 846, 878 (1992) (affirming the “essential holding” of Roe, while allowing the 
state to promote its “profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy “so long as the 
measures adopted by the state do not “constitute an undue burden”). 
 250. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 251. As noted above, this goes beyond non-discrimination to address the sexual division of labor 
itself.  It includes economic, social and cultural rights as well as affirmative measures to compensate 
for past discrimination.  Finally, it builds on a growing international equality jurisprudence, 
including recent developments addressing same-sex relationships.  See supra Part I. 
 252. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 759, 762 (1999). 
 253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893. 
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Second, “privacy” is negative; it requires the state to refrain from taking 
action rather than imposing any affirmative obligations.  As Professor Frances 
Olsen and others note, grounding reproductive rights in privacy, accordingly, 
undercuts claims for public funding.254  Rather, American proponents have long 
argued that these rights should be grounded in “equality.”255  As Professors Neil 
Siegel and Reva Siegel recently discovered, Justice Ginsburg relied on equality 
while representing a pregnant service woman in 1972.256  As Professor Anita 
Allen explains, the equality argument includes two propositions.  First, 
“prohibiting abortion is a form of prima facie or de jure sex discrimination,” and, 
second, it “results from constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes.”257  Both 
propositions, as explained above, are encompassed by CEDAW. 
But there are problems with equality under Constitutional doctrine.  As 
Professor Law notes: “[T]he development of modern constitutional sex equality 
doctrine has suffered from a lack of focus on biological reproductive differences 
between men and women.”258  In addition, sex-based classifications are only 
viewed as ‘quasi-suspect’ by the Supreme Court.259  Unlike race, they do not 
trigger strict scrutiny.  As Professor Suzanne Goldberg has shown, this has 
produced a hopelessly convoluted jurisprudence.260  Like privacy doctrine, 
moreover, equal protection imposes no affirmative obligations on the state. 
 
 254. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 113 (1989). 
 255. Balkin, supra note 10, at 19 (explaining Siegel’s argument that exemptions show that 
“abortion restrictions are deeply tied to stereotypical views about the sexes and about the duties of 
women”); see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on 
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 419 (1995).  See generally 
CHAMALLAS, supra note 138, at 304; Balkin, supra note 10, at 35 (grounding reproductive rights in 
liberty and equality). 
 256. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 773-74 (2010) (citing Ginsburg’s brief on behalf 
of a pregnant service woman in a case that was settled); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Postscript to 
Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J.  799, 800 (2010) (noting that “the authors have captured just what 
was on my mind and in my heart”).  Katharine Bartlett, then a law student, made a similar 
argument.  See Bartlett, supra note 56; Barbara Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-94 (1971); Siegel, supra note 65, at 
72 (noting that “[p]hysical differences between the sexes, in particular a women’s [sic] unique 
capacity to gestate life, occasion some of the most persistent and deep-rooted assumptions about the 
different roles and worth of men and women”). 
 257. Allen, supra note 255, at 437; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (“Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to 
vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather they center on a woman’s autonomy to 
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”). 
 258. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984); see also 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 
137, 147-52 (discussing intersection between privacy and equality in the context of reproductive 
rights). 
 259. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma law setting a higher age limit 
for males than for females to purchase 3.2% beer because the sex-based classification was not 
“substantially related” to an “important government purpose”). 
 260. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004) 
(arguing for a single standard for equal protection analysis); Deborah Brake et al., Centennial Panel: 
Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1 (1997).  Law argues that the burden should be on the state in cases of sex discrimination:  
“Given how central state regulation of biology has been to the subjugation of women, the normal 
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Third, as Professors Martha Fineman, Robin West and Ruth Colker have 
argued, equality does not go far enough.  As Professor Fineman explains, “[A]n 
impoverished sense of equality is embedded in our current legal doctrine.  We 
understand equality in terms that are formal, focused on discrimination, and 
inattentive to underlying societal inequities.”261  Instead, she argues for a “richer 
and more robust guarantee of equality,”262 grounded in “the term ‘vulnerable’ 
for its potential in describing a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the 
human condition that must be at the heart of our concept of social and state 
responsibility.”263  Professor West, similarly, faults the legalistic safeguards of 
Roe and Casey for neglecting the social and economic circumstances in which 
reproductive choices are made.264  As Professor Colker concludes, “A woman in 
my view has the right to seek an abortion to protect the value of her life in a 
society that disproportionately imposes the burdens of pregnancy and child care 
on women and does not sufficiently sponsor the development and use of safe, 
effective contraceptives.”265 
CEDAW addresses all of these issues.  Equality under CEDAW is more 
muscular than equality under American equal protection doctrine.  First, it is 
broader in scope.  It bars all forms of discrimination; there is no requirement of 
intent, state action, or disparate impact.266  Second, it requires states to focus on 
the “underlying societal inequities” that concern Professor Fineman and to 
proactively address the social and economic circumstances in which 
reproductive choices are made, as Professor West urges.  Thus, the refusal to 
pay for poor women’s abortions, which the Supreme Court upheld in Maher v. 
Roe267 and Harris v. McRae268 would be barred under CEDAW.  Third, CEDAW 
 
presumption of constitutionality is inappropriate and the state should bear the burden of justifying 
its rule . . . .“  Law, supra note 258, at 1009. 
     Ratification of CEDAW would not necessarily subject gender-based regulations to the same 
standard as race-based regulations.  As Professors Chinkin and Charlesworth have pointed out, for 
example, the obligations imposed on state parties under the Women’s Convention require them to 
take “all appropriate measures without delay” in contrast to the “immediately binding” obligations 
imposed under the Race Convention.  CHINKIN & CHARLESWORTH, supra note 13, at 45. 
 261. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008). 
 262. Id. at 9. 
 263. Id. at 8; see also Shalleck, supra note 9. 
 264. See generally Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion 
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009) [hereinafter West, From Choice].  West argues elsewhere that 
“[M]othering children, as we presently socially construct that work, is incompatible with the basic 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship.”  Robin West, Robin West (Concurring in the Judgment), in 
WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 10, at 141.  Assuring reproductive rights, for 
West, is “pathetically inadequate.”  Id.  But see Reva B. Siegel, The Constitutional Law and Politics of 
Reproductive Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1312, 1314-15 (criticizing West, From Choice, supra). 
 265. Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 
CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1050 (1989); see also RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-
LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW (1992). 
 266. See supra Part I.B.1; Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, 
supra note 187, at 269, 275. 
 267.  432 U.S. 464, 469, 474 (1977) (holding that neither the state nor the federal government must 
pay for a poor woman's abortion). 
 268. 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that “[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent 
woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the 
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explicitly recognizes the social importance of reproduction, that is, the 
importance of reproduction to the larger community.  Thus, under CEDAW, 
those claiming reproductive rights are not “left alone” in the private sphere,269 
but welcomed into the public sphere with appropriate accommodations for 
workers, including pregnant or nursing workers, and their children.  CEDAW 
further recognizes the obligation of the larger community to provide actual 
material support before, during, and after birth.  As Professor Law explains, this 
is crucial to women’s equality.  She understands, as did the CEDAW framers, 
that gender equality requires “transformation of the family, child-bearing 
arrangements, the economy, the wage/labor market, and human 
consciousness.”270 
There is an additional issue.  The abortion cases also recognize the “State’s 
interest in potential life.”271  Ninth Amendment privacy does not outweigh this 
interest as long as the state statute or regulation does not place “a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”272  Under international 
human rights law, the state interest in “potential life” would probably not 
outweigh CEDAW-strength equality.  As Professor Philip Alston has explained, 
a fetus is not considered a “person” under international law.273  As Professor 
Balkin notes, many American jurists have reached a similar conclusion.274  
 
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.”).  But 
see MacKinnon, supra note 112, at 1320 (arguing that “only women can be disadvantaged, for a 
reason specific to sex, through state-mandated restrictions on abortion.  The denial of funding for 
Medicaid abortions obviously violates this right.  The Medicaid issue connects the maternity 
historically forced on African American women integral to their exploitation under slavery with the 
motherhood effectively forced on poor women, many of whom are Black, by deprivation of 
government funding for abortions.  For those who have not noticed, the abortion right has already 
been lost: this was when.”). 
 269. See generally McClain, supra note 252 (discussing limits of privacy doctrine). 
 270. Law, supra note 258, at 956; see Leonhardt, supra note 124 (noting that “[w]ith Australia’s 
recent passage of paid [parental] leave, the United States has become the only rich country without 
such a policy”). 
 271. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 156 (1973). 
 272. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  As Johnsen notes, “Casey 
allowed the government substantially greater authority to interfere with women’s reproductive 
choices.  The Court overruled protective rulings from the 1980s and upheld the very types of 
restrictions it previously had held to be unconstitutional.”  Dawn E. Johnsen, A Progressive 
Reproductive Rights Agenda for 2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 187, at 255, 257.  But see 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 996 
(2003) (arguing that Casey “implicates the human existence of millions of lives a year” (referring to 
“human unborn child[ren]”)). 
 273. Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 173 (1990). 
 274. As Balkin and others have pointed out, if a fetus is a person from the moment of conception, 
allowing abortion in the case of incest or rape makes no more sense than excusing murder because 
the victim was produced from a coerced or incestuous union.  Jack M. Balkin, Jack M. Balkin 
(Judgment of the Court), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 10, at 63; Mark Tushnet, 
Mark Tushnet (Concurring), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 10, at 86, 89 (citing 
Justice Clark:“[n]o prosecutor has ever returned a murder indictment charging the taking of the life 
of a fetus.  This would not be the case if the fetus constituted human life.”). 
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Professor Siegel suggests that statutes permitting abortion in cases of rape or 
incest implicitly concede the point.275 
Where, like here, international law provides greater protection than that 
afforded by domestic law, the state should not prevail.  As Professor Lori 
Damrosch explained with respect to the Torture Convention: 
If the Administration is correct about the substantial conformity of U.S. law to 
the Convention’s requirements, then there is no reason to erect an artificial 
barrier to the application of the Convention as a complementary but fully 
compatible source of law.  On the other hand, to the extent that the Convention 
may provide greater protection than Constitution or statutory law . . . it is all the 
more important to allow the Convention to operate of its own force.276 
Whether CEDAW’s more muscular equality would lead to a different 
standard would be an open question to be decided by the Roberts Court.  As 
journalist Adam Liptak recently observed, the Roberts Court is the “most 
conservative Court in decades,”277 and it seems willing to leave reproductive 
rights to the states.278  As Dawn Johnsen notes, “Since Casey, states have adopted 
literally hundreds of abortion restrictions, reflecting an incremental, multitiered 
strategy to create ‘abortion-free’ states and to deter women from having 
abortions, often through deception.”279  The Supreme Court has also expressed 
doubts about drawing on international law although, as Professor Martha Davis 
and Bethany Withers point out, “Justice Scalia cited transnational law on 
abortion rights in his dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, using it to argue that the U.S. 
law on the subject was relatively liberal.” 280 
 
 275. “The statutory exception allowing women to have abortions if they conceive by rape 
indicates that the state’s decision to prohibit abortion rests on unarticulated assumptions about how 
women are to comport themselves sexually─a code the state enforces by selectively allowing women 
access to abortion.”  Siegel, supra note 65, at 77. 
 276. Damrosch, supra note 215, at 522. 
 277. Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts is Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 
2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/ 25roberts.html (noting that ”[a]bortion 
rights are likely to be curtailed.”); see also Johnsen, supra note 272, at 258 (noting that while “litigation 
has served as the primary and most effective weapon against dangerous abortion restrictions . . . A 
Court-centered strategy for the coming decades would be dangerously inadequate”). 
 278. Liptak, supra note 277; see Resnik, supra note 266, at 273 (noting that ”federalism” is often 
relied upon by opponents of U.S. ratification of human rights conventions, including CEDAW).  See 
generally Balkin, supra note 10, at 3-4 (noting that “[t]hirty years after Roe, Americans remain divided 
over abortion rights.  Polling data consistently show majority support for some form of abortion 
right, and overwhelming majorities favor the legal availability of abortion in cases of rape, incest, or 
when a woman’s life or health would be jeopardized.”). 
 279. Johnsen, supra note 272, at 261. 
 280. Davis & Withers supra note 116, at 38.  As the authors further note, “recent scholarly writing 
on the role of ‘human dignity’ in domestic abortion adjudication underscores the ways in which U.S. 
jurisprudence in [the area of reproductive rights] already draws significantly from transnational 
human rights norms.”  Id.; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Progressive Constitutionalism and Transnational 
Legal Discourse, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 187, at 285, 285 (noting the “United States’ 
long history of using foreign law and the ‘law of nations’ in constitutional interpretation”). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has explained how CEDAW bars the reproduction of gender, 
and why that requires nothing less than the full assurance of women’s 
reproductive rights.  It has explained how earlier human rights law recognized 
women’s reproductive rights, and how that law fell short.  CEDAW goes 
beyond mere non-discrimination to assure equality on steroids; it situates 
reproductive rights in the public sphere, and requires states—as well as non-
state actors—to respect, protect, and fulfill them.  CEDAW challenges, and 
firmly rejects, the sexual division of labor in its endless cultural variations. 
Part I drew on decades of rigorous empirical work to show the depths of 
women’s poverty and how, exactly, that poverty is grounded in the sexual 
division of labor.  This Part concluded by describing the trend in international 
equality jurisprudence toward recognition of same-sex relationships.  Like 
CEDAW’s bar on the reproduction of gender, this jurisprudence exposes the 
sexual division of labor as a human construct, which can and should be 
repudiated. 
Part II showed how the denial of women’s reproductive rights specifically 
reproduces gender.  It takes control of their own reproductive capacity away 
from women, relegating them to a sexual division of labor based on biological 
differences.  It puts their bodies at the service of men or the state.  The denial of 
reproductive rights reproduces gender whether by a state or a non-state party, 
whether by explicit prohibitions or by the failure to provide necessary services, 
including childcare. 
 Part III explained how this plays out, internationally and in the United 
States.  Part III first drew on recent work on the fragmentation of international 
law to describe the proliferation of national applications.  It concluded by 
situating this law in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, showing how the 
arguments set out in this Article resonate with the arguments of Justice 
Ginsburg, and Professors Law, Siegel and others, to ground reproductive rights 
in equality, rather than privacy.  Efforts to do so under the U.S. Constitution 
have failed.  As this Article demonstrates, CEDAW’s broad and powerful bar on 
the reproduction of gender is stronger than equal protection.  It can do the work 
necessary to assure reproductive rights, the bedrock of women’s equality. 
 
